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a b s t r a c t 
We use an overlapping generations (OLG) life-cycle model with distortionary taxation on 
labor and capital to derive a threshold dependency ratio, i.e. a point in the cross-section dis- 
tribution of the population beyond which tax revenues can no longer sustain the planned 
level of transfers to retirees. We quantify the level of the threshold; the distance of the 
economy from the threshold; and the probability of reaching the threshold at some point 
in the future. The model is calibrated on the United States and fourteen European coun- 
tries which have dependency ratios among the highest in the world. We examine the ef- 
fects on the threshold and welfare of a number of policies often advocated to improve the 
sustainability of pension systems. New tax data on dynamic Laffer effects are provided. 
© 2020 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier B.V. 
This is an open access article under the CC BY license. 
( http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ ) 
1. Introduction 
Background. This paper examines the sustainability of pension systems using an OLG life-cycle model with distortionary 
taxation that takes into account the possibility of an upper limit on the real value of tax revenues raised through direct 
taxation. The limit exists because tax revenues are subject to dynamic Laffer effects (DLEs) due to the distortionary taxation 
of the factors of production. Our main result is that, in an OLG life-cycle model, DLEs imply the existence of an upper 
bound, or threshold, on the dependency ratio (the number of retirees as a proportion of the labor force) of the economy. 
This threshold identifies a critical point in the cross-section of the age-distribution of the population beyond which tax 
revenue from direct taxation can no longer sustain the planned level of transfers to retirees. We refer to this as the threshold 
dependency ratio . This is determined by the structure of the economy, the design of fiscal policy and evolves over time due 
to demographic changes. The threshold dependency ratio can be used as an indicator of the sustainability of a pension 
system and to evaluate the impact of pension policy reforms. 
We show that the threshold dependency ratio is derived from a subset of the competitive equilibria achievable in an OLG 
life-cycle economy. This subset includes all competitive equilibria in which the government chooses tax policy to maximize 
tax revenue. The threshold is then derived from the government budget constraint. We are interested in characterizing the 
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level of the threshold in a given period and its projection over the medium and long term, with a view of comparing this 
against existing demographic projections. 
Demographic projections possess a significant degree of uncertainty. We exploit this to derive a statistical measure of the 
distance between the projected dependency ratio and the threshold. We use this distance in conjunction with the distribu- 
tion of stochastic demographic forecasts to measure the probability of an economy reaching the threshold at some point in 
the future. The distance from the threshold indicates to what extent the government can exploit its ability to raise revenue 
through direct taxation in order to maintain current levels of publicly funded support for older people. The probability of 
reaching the threshold indicates how likely a government is to be able to sustain the pension system through direct taxation 
in the medium and long run. The probability of reaching the threshold also provides a direct comparison of the effects of 
policy on the sustainability of a pension system, including changes in the retirement age. 
The existence of the threshold affects both the beneficiaries of and the contributors to the social security net. Once 
the dependency ratio reaches the threshold - the distance is then zero - the government can no longer sustain the social 
security net for older people through an increase in direct taxation. It then faces a choice of either partially reneging on its 
social security commitments, for example, by reforming the pension system and making people retire later, or of increasing 
indirect taxation, or possibly reducing other types of public spending. 
Quantitative studies on dynamic fiscal policy based on large-scale (life-cycle) simulation models typically focus on the 
United States. Our analysis breaks new ground by covering, in addition to the United States, fourteen European (EU14) 
countries. This extension is particularly interesting as the results for these EU14 countries are much more dramatic than 
those for the United States; their dependency ratios have reached some of the highest values in the world by 2010, and are 
projected to increase very rapidly by 2100. For each country, we start by quantifying the current size of the fiscal space as 
measured by the potential increase in tax revenue that could be achieved if tax rates on income from capital and labor were 
set to maximize tax revenues. This gives an indication of a country’s ability to sustain the pension system through increase 
in direct taxation alone. We then measure the threshold over the period 2010–2100 and use stochastic population forecasts 
to quantify the distance from the threshold and the probability of reaching the threshold in the medium and long run. 
The threshold dependency ratio is a useful statistics to evaluate the effects of different types of policy intervention. 
For this reason, we consider four alternative policy scenarios. The first covers the case of no-policy change (S1-NPC). The 
remaining three policy scenarios reflect reforms typically advocated for improving the sustainability of existing pension 
systems ( Council, 2012 ): increasing the consumption tax rate by 5 percentage points (S2-ICT), reducing the replacement 
ratio of pensions by 10 percentage points (S3-RRR) and increasing the retirement age from 65 to 70 (S4-IRA). We examine 
the contribution that these policy changes may make in increasing the distance from the threshold and/or reducing the 
probability of reaching the threshold in the medium and long term. We also rank these reforms based on their welfare 
effects on the cohorts of individuals alive during 2010–2100. 
Quantitative results We find that the size of the fiscal space in the United States ranges between 32 and 47% in 2010 
(depending on whether the public sector is committed to maintain either the level or the replacement ratio of pensions, 
respectively) and is expected to grow over the period 2010–2100, though not fast. The threshold dependency ratio in the 
United States in 2010 is about three times larger than the actual dependency ratio (61 vs 22%). If no policy change is 
implemented, the probability of reaching the threshold is zero in 2050 but about 4% in 2100. Under the policy scenario S2- 
ICT the probability of reaching the threshold by 2100 declines to about 2%. Under the policy scenarios S3-RRR and S4-IRA 
the probability of reaching the threshold falls to zero by 2100. 
The outlook is very different for the EU14 countries. Compared to the United States, they have, on average, narrower 
fiscal spaces, more generous pension systems, are older (higher dependency ratios) and are expected to age much faster. On 
average across the EU14 countries the threshold dependency ratio is only 0.2 times larger than the actual dependency ratio 
in 2010. If no policy change is implemented, dependency ratios in all EU14 countries are expected to overtake the threshold 
well before 2100. Under the policy reform scenarios S2-ICT, S3-RRR and S4-IRA, respectively, the number of countries that 
are expected to exceed the threshold dependency ratio before 2100 reduces to thirteen, eleven and nine. The outlook is 
worst for Austria, Belgium, France, Greece, Italy, Spain and the three Scandinavian countries. If no change in policy is under- 
taken, on average, these countries are expected to exceed the threshold dependency ratio by 2030. This date is postponed 
by 5, 15 and 40 years under the policy reform scenarios S2-ICT, S3-RRR and S4-IRA, respectively. These results highlight how 
imminent is the need of significant pension system reforms for the public finances of the EU14 countries. We also consider 
the projected impact of pension policy reforms carried out by the EU14 countries on their thresholds using data from the 
2018 Ageing Report of the European Commission. 1 The results vary across countries since the thresholds tend to follow 
trajectories that mimic the demographic evolution of the projected dependecy ratio. This is consistent with the observation 
that most of these reforms include mechanisms that automatically index key pension parameters to demographic changes. 
Nevertheless the increase in the threshold resulting from these reforms appears to be limited to few countries and modest 
is size. 
The welfare analysis compares the effects of three alternative changes to policy that would give the same degree of pro- 
tection, and hence sustainability, to existing pension provision through yielding the same distance from the threshold by 
2050. The three policies are a change to the consumption tax rate, to pension contributions and to the retirement age. For 
1 See EPC (2018) . 
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the United States we find that of the three policy reforms, the greatest welfare gains are obtained through an increase of 
the taxation of consumption, as this leads to the largest reduction of the distortionary taxation on income from capital and 
labor. A similar result for the United States is found by De Nardi et al. (1999) , Kotlikoff et al. (2007) and Conesa et al. (2016) . 
In contrast, we find that this is not necessarily the best policy option for most of the EU14 countries, as increasing the retire- 
ment age and/or reducing pension contributions achieve greater welfare gains than increasing the taxation of consumption. 
These contrasting welfare results reflect differences in tax burdens, demographic structures and discount factors among the 
EU14 countries. 
A by-product of our numerical analysis is the quantification of revenue maximizing tax rates in an OLG life-cycle model. 
This contributes to the existing quantitative literature on DLEs which is based on infinitely-lived agent models. We provide 
a new data set of revenue-maximizing tax rates on capital and labor for the United States and the EU14 countries based 
on a life-cycle model. When keeping constant the replacement ratio of pensions, these tax rates are generally in line with 
those obtained by Trabandt and Uhlig (2011) using infinitely-lived agent models. The OLG life-cycle model, however, gives 
significantly lower revenue-maximizing tax rates on capital and labor when the level of pension per-capita is kept constant. 
We also use the OLG life-cycle model calibrated on the United States to highlight how population aging impacts on the 
position and shape of the Laffer curves, and how uncertainty about demographic projections impacts on DLEs. 
Related literature. The paper is related to the extensive literature on the implications of aging for the sustain- 
ability of social security systems based on multi-period OLG models. See, for example, Auerbach et al. (1983) , 
Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987) , De Nardi et al. (1999) , Fuster et al. (2007) , Kotlikoff et al. (2007) , Heer and Irmen (2014) , 
Conesa et al. (2016) and Imrohoro ̆glu et al. (2016) . 2 These studies evaluate how aging is likely to increase the tax burden re- 
quired to fund the social security system over a given period of time and how the resulting welfare cost could be mitigated 
through various reforms of the social security system, including partial financing with a consumption tax, reduction of social 
security transfers or increase in the eligibility age. This paper contributes to this literature by providing a measure of the 
limits faced by tax policy in maintaining the sustainability of pension systems through the threshold dependency ratio and 
by assessing the probability that an economy will reach a point at which reforms will be inevitable. A further contribution 
is the quantitative analysis of the pension systems of 14 European countries as well as that of the United States. This is 
particularly important as the sustainability of the pension systems in Europe is an even more pressing issue than it is for 
the United States. 
Our paper is also related to the growing literature on the implications for public finances and macroeconomic policy 
of DLEs, typified by the works Davig et al. (2010) , Trabandt and Uhlig (2011) , Bi (2012) ; D’Erasmo et al. (2016) ; Polito 
and Wickens (2014, 2015) . 3 The common denominator among these studies is their use of infinitely-lived agent models. We 
contribute to this literature by studying DLEs in a life-cycle model and by considering their implications for the sustainability 
of pension systems. As noted above, the paper contributes to the Laffer curve literature by providing new data on the peack 
of the Laffer curves for the same country coverage of Trabandt and Uhlig (2011) , using instead an OLG model. The present 
paper also highlights how Laffer curves across countries are affected by the way that tax revenue is shared among retirees, 
aging and uncertainty about demographic projections. 
Park (2012) studies how aging affects the size of the fiscal space in G7 countries using a neoclassical growth model 
with infinitely-lived agents. Ma and Tran (2016) consider the same issue for Japan and the United States, but using a model 
with OLG households. Holter et al. (2018) and Guner et al. (2016) consider DLEs in a large-scale model with overlapping 
generations. Their aim is to quantify how much extra tax revenue can be generated in the United States by increasing the 
progressivity of the tax system. In these two studies, DLEs impose an upper bound on a government’s ability to redistribute 
resources in the economy. The present paper differs in several respects from these works. Our main focus is on how DLEs 
contribute to determining the threshold dependency ratio. The threshold imposes an upper bound on a government’s ability 
to sustain the pension system in the medium and long terms. We study the probability of reaching this threshold at some 
point in the future and, in a wider quantitative analysis, the effects on the threshold of demographic shifts throughout 
2010–2100. We also study the welfare implications for major pension-system reforms. 
A number of issues concerning particular features of existing pension systems are beyond the scope of this paper. These 
include normative questions such as why we have the pension systems that we do and whether there is a socially optimal 
level of redistribution from workers to older people. 4 Our analysis is positive, being confined to the financial sustainability 
of a pension system in the presence of fiscal limits, the policy changes that can be implemented to maintain the social 
security net for older people and the welfare costs that societies may incur in implementing these changes. 
Paper structure. The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the OLG life-cycle model used for the analysis 
of dynamic fiscal policy and derives the threshold dependency ratio, the distance from the threshold and the probability 
of reaching the threshold. Section 3 describes the benchmark calibration used for the quantitative analysis. Sections 4 and 
2 A related branch of this literature focuses on the macroeconomic effects of reforms of the United States’ tax system, see for example Altig et al. (2001) , 
Conesa et al. (2009) , Guner et al. (2012, 2016) . 
3 In these works, DLEs are quantified by calculating competitive equilibria over given grids for the tax rates. Babel and Huggett (2017) illustrate how to 
predict the top of the Laffer curve directly using the sufficient statistic approach. 
4 Diamond (2004) and Diamond and Orszag (2005) present various economic arguments underpinning the existence of social security contributions. 
Shiller (2005) and RMWJ et al. (2011) survey advantages and disadvantages of individual savings accounts for social insurance. Volume 19, issue 2, of the 
Journal of Economic Perspectives collects a series of different views on social security and reforms of social security systems. 
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5% the results for the United States and the EU14 countries, respectively. In Section 6 we consider a number of extensions 
of the benchmark model: income heterogeneity, non-linear taxation, labor decisons at the extensive margin, variation in 
college attainments. Section 7 concludes. 
2. The model 
The economy is described by a life-cycle model comprising a large number of OLG of households with a finite life, a 
representative firm and government. Each household includes one individual who makes consumption, saving and labor 
supply decisions to maximize lifetime utility. The firm uses aggregate capital and labor to maximize profits, while operating 
a neoclassical production technology. Consumption, income from labor and income from capital are subject to proportional 
taxes. The government uses tax revenue and issues debt to finance the provision of public consumption goods and the social 
security system, which includes transfers to all individuals and pension payments. 
2.1. Demographics 
In each period t ≥ 0 a new cohort of individuals is born and denoted by its date of birth. Individuals in each cohort 
live for J + 1 periods, with J ≥ 1. In t = 0 , J cohorts of individuals are already alive, each indexed by their date of birth 
( −1 , −2 , . . . , −J). We denote by j 0 t the age of an individual in t = 0 , so that for any cohort born in t ≥ −J, j 
0 
t = max { −t, 0 } . 
The probability of surviving until age j in period t + j, conditional on being alive at age j − 1 in period t + j − 1 is φt,j . 
5 This 
is non-zero in each age j , other than in the last period, i.e. φt,j  = 0 for j ∈ 
(
j 0 t , J − 1 
)
and φt,J+1 = 0 . The population grows 
at the rate n > −1 . The share of individuals of age j in the population, μj , is given by μ j = μ0 / ( 1 + n ) 
j for j ∈ (1, J ), with 
∑ J 
j=0 
μ j = 1 . 
Individuals work in the first j R − 1 periods of their life and retire from age j R onwards, with j R ∈ (2, J ). For the numerical 
analysis, each period, t , corresponds to five years. Newborns have a real-life age of 20–24 ( j = 0 ), retire at age 65 ( j R = 9 ) 
and live up to age 94 ( J = 14 ) . The dependency ratio d is defined as: 
d = d 
((
μ j 
)J 
j=0 
, n, j R 
)
= 
μR 
μW 
, (1) 
where μR = 
∑ J 
j= j R 
μ j and μ
W = 
∑ j R −1 
j=0 
μ j denote the shares in the population of retirees and workers, respectively. The 
dependency ratio is determined by four factors: the maximum life duration J , the distribution of age- j individuals in the 
population, the growth rate of the population and the retirement age. The first three are affected by population aging, 
through reductions in birth rates and increases in life expectancy. Given life expectancy, a decline in the birth rate results in 
a reduction of n that leads to an increase in the number of retirees relative to workers in the population. Given the birth rate, 
an increase in life expectancy, for example through a reduction in the mortality rate, leads to increase in the dependency 
ratio, as would a change in μj and/or J for any given n . Without loss of generality, we abstract from exogenous changes in the 
cross-section distribution of the population due, for example, to migration. 6 We treat J, μj ’s and n as exogenous although, 
in practice, they could be related to the economic environment and policy, and hence be endogenous. Making these three 
variables endogenous would not affect our qualitative results. The retirement age j R indicates the age from which individuals 
start receiving old-age social security contributions. This could be either an endogenous variable chosen by the individual 
conditional on the minimum retirement age set by the government or a policy parameter, depending on how social security 
eligibility is regulated in the economy. 7 The OLG life-cycle model of the economy described here is compatible with both 
these interpretations, since the existence of the threshold and its related statistics (distance and probability) do not depend 
on the mechanism underlying the choice of j R . We appraise the effect of variation of j R in the quantitative analysis. 
2.2. Environment 
Households. Individuals within each cohort are the same. Newborns start their life with no assets and do not leave be- 
quests, thus a t, 0 = a t,J+1 = 0 . They are also endowed with one unit of time at each age of their life. This is shared between 
labor and leisure during the working age. No labor is supplied during retirement. Each unit of time devoted to labor provides 
z j ≥ 0 units of productivity. 
5 Throughout the paper, unless otherwise indicated, the first subscript denotes the date in which an individual is born, whereas the second denotes the 
age of the individual. Thus the sum of the two subscripts is the current period. Variables with only one time subscript are not age dependent and the 
subscript denotes the period in which are observed. 
6 In the quantitative analysis we account for the impact on any factor influencing the demographic structure of the population, including migration. This 
is because our measure of the distance from the threshold and the probability of reaching the threshold depend on forecasts of dependency ratios in the 
medium and long-term that account for these factors. 
7 All the studies based on life-cycle models cited in the Introduction assume that the retirement age is exogenous. Fehr et al. (2013) and Kitao (2014) , 
among others, study a large-scale lfe-cycle model with endogenous retirement. 
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Individual preferences depend on consumption and leisure. For any t ≥ −J, these are ordered by the expected lifetime 
utility: 
U t = 
J ∑ 
j = j 0 t 
β j − j 
0 
t 
( 
j ∏ 
s = j 0 t 
φt,s 
) 
u 
(
c t, j , l t, j 
)
, (2) 
where β = ( 1 + ρ) −1 is the common discount factor, with ρ denoting the discount rate; where φt,s denotes the probability of 
surviving until age s in period t + s, conditional on being alive at age s − 1 in period t + s − 1 ; c t,j and l t,j are the consumption 
and the labor supply of an individual of age j born in period t , respectively. Utility u is strictly increasing in consumption 
and leisure, twice continuously differentiable, strictly concave and satisfies the Inada conditions. Following Trabandt and 
Uhlig (2011) , the instantaneous utility is specified as: 
u (c t, j , l t, j ) = 
1 
1 − η
(
c 
1 −η
t, j 
[
1 − κ(1 − η) l 1+1 /ϕ 
t, j 
]η
− 1 
)
, (3) 
where κ > 0 is the weight attached to labor disutility, ϕ is the Frisch elasticity of labor supply, and η is the inverse of the 
intertemporal elasticity of substitution. Individuals have perfect foresight. The budget constraints faced by individuals for 
j ∈ 
(
j 0 t , J 
)
are: 
q t, j c t, j + a t, j+1 = x t, j + tr t, j + 
(
1 + r t, j 
)
a t, j , (4) 
in which 
x t, j = 
{
w t, j z j l t, j for j ∈ 
(
j 0 t , j R − 1 
)
p t, j for j ∈ ( j R , J ) 
, (5) 
l t, j = 0 for j ∈ ( j R , J ) , (6) 
a t, 0 = a t,J+1 = 0 . (7) 
Further, q t, j = 1 + τ
c 
t, j 
, w t, j = 
(
1 − τ l 
t, j 
)
̂ wt+ j and r t, j = 
(
1 − τ k 
t, j 
)
̂ r t+ j are the after-tax prices of consumption, income from 
labor and income from capital, respectively; τ c 
t, j 
, τ l 
t, j 
and τ k 
t, j 
are the corresponding age-dependent tax rates; ̂ wt+ j and ̂  r t+ j 
denote the pre-tax prices of labor and capital; tr t,j are age-related transfers; p t,j is the pension received by retired individuals. 
For an individual born in t of age j , the solution to the lifetime maximization problem is the sequence of allocations (
c t, j , l t, j , a t, j+1 
)J 
j = j 0 t 
that for any t ≥ −J satisfies the necessary and sufficient conditions: 
u c t, j = q t, j λt, j , for j ∈ 
(
j 0 t , J 
)
, (8) 
u 1 −l t, j = λt, j z j w t, j , for j ∈ 
(
j 0 t , j R − 1 
)
, (9) 
λt, j = βλt, j+1 
(
1 + r t, j+1 
)
, for j ∈ 
(
j 0 t , J − 1 
)
, (10) 
and the constraints in (4) –(7) , where λt,j is the Lagrange multiplier associated with an individual’s budget constraint. 
For the numerical analysis, we make five modifications to household budget constraint in Eq. (4) . First, labor productivity 
is assumed to be also time dependent. Thus we set z t, j = A t y j , where A t is the time-varying component of labor productivity 
growing at the constant rate g A ≥ 0 and y j , with j ∈ 
(
j 0 t , j R − 1 
)
, is the age-dependent component of labor productivity. 
Under this specification, pre-tax labor income is given by ̂ wt A t y j l t, j . Second, taxes are age-independent. Third, households 
contribute to the pension system through a proportional social security tax levied on wage income at the rate τ p t . Thus 
the after-tax labor income is 
(
1 − τ p t − τ
w 
t 
)
A t y j ̂  wt l t, j , with τ
l 
t = τ
p 
t + τ
w 
t , for t ≥ 0. Fourth, transfers are age-independent, 
t r t, j = t r t for any t ≥ 0 and j ∈ 
(
j 0 t , J 
)
. Fifth, pension payments are also age-independent, being set as a constant proportion 
(replacement ratio) θ of the average labor income in the economy ̂ wt l t /μW , thus p t = θ
(
̂ wt l t /μW 
)
for any t ≥ 0. 
In equilibrium the household is indifferent between holding assets in the form of physical capital or government debt, 
since both yield the same (certain) after-tax return. With a single household living for two periods the proportion of asset 
holdings would be the same at the household and the aggregate level, but with many periods, the portfolio allocation is 
indeterminate. Consequently, without loss of generality, we assume that each household holds the two assets in the same 
fixed proportions. 
Firms. In each period t ≥ 0 there is a single produced good that can be used as private consumption, public consump- 
tion or capital. Goods are produced by a neoclassical production function with constant returns to scale, y t = f ( k t , l t ) − δk t , 
where y t and k t denote per-capita net output and capital, respectively; δ is the rate of physical depreciation and f is mono- 
tonically increasing, strictly concave and satisfies the Inada conditions. Factors of production are paid their marginal prod- 
ucts. The before-tax prices of capital and labor are: 
̂ r t = f k t − δ, (11) 
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̂ wt = f l t , (12) 
respectively. Production is described by a Cobb-Douglas function with labor-augmenting technological progress, f ( k t , l t ) = 
k αt ( A t l t ) 
1 −α . Under this specification, the balanced-growth rate of the economy is equal to the growth rate of labor produc- 
tivity, g A ≥ 0. 
Government. The government finances an exogenous sequence of public consumption, transfers and pension payments, 
( g t , tr t , p t ) 
∞ 
t=0 , through revenue from taxation, ( tax t ) 
∞ 
t=0 , and by issuing public debt, ( b t ) 
∞ 
t=1 (all variables are in per-capita 
terms). The sequence of government budget constraints for t ≥ 0 is given by: 
g t + tr t + p t + ( 1 + ̂  r t ) b t = tax t + ( 1 + n ) b t+1 , (13) 
where tax revenue in any t ≥ 0 is given by: 
tax t = 
J ∑ 
j=0 
(
q t− j, j − 1 
)
μ j c t− j, j + 
j R −1 ∑ 
j=0 
(
̂ wt − w t− j, j 
)
μ j z j l t− j, j (14) 
+ 
J ∑ 
j=0 
(̂
 r t − r t− j, j 
)
μ j a t− j, j . 
Fiscal policy is subject to the solvency condition: 
lim 
T →∞ 
b T ∏ t 
s =0 
( 1+ ̂ r s ) 
( 1+ n ) 
= 0 . (15) 
There is a separate balanced-budget for pensions, so that aggregate expenditure on pensions is equal to the aggregate rev- 
enue raised through the social security tax: 
τ p ̂  wt l t = p t μ
R . (16) 
For the numerical analysis, government expenditures (consumption and transfers) grow at the exogenous balanced-growth 
rate. Government revenue is augmented to include all accidental bequests from households that do not survive. This is 
equivalent to assume that the government collects all accidental bequests and redistributes them as lump-sums to house- 
holds as, for example, in Krueger and Ludwig (2007) , Braun and Joines (2015) and Holter et al. (2018) . 
Note how the dependency ratio is implicitly accounted for in the constraints faced by fiscal policy through Eqs. (13) , () 
and (16) , since these depend on the same J , 
(
μ j 
)J 
j=0 
, n and j R that determine d in Eq. (1) . This observation motivates the 
derivation of the threshold dependency ratio in the next section. 
Market-clearing and Feasibility. The equilibrium conditions for per-capita labor, asset holdings and consumption are: 
l t = 
j R −1 ∑ 
j=0 
μ j z j l t− j, j , (17) 
a t = 
J ∑ 
j=0 
μ j a t− j, j = k t + b t , (18) 
c t = 
J ∑ 
j=0 
μ j c t− j, j , (19) 
respectively. The per-capita resource constraint requires 
y t + ( 1 − δ) k t = c t + g t + ( 1 + n ) k t+1 . (20) 
Transfers and pension payments per-capita are t r t = 
∑ J 
j=0 
μ j t r t− j, j and p t = 
∑ J 
j= j R 
μ j p t− j, j , respectively. All variables, other 
than labor, are made stationary by expressing them as a proportion of technological progress. The stationary equilibrium is 
described in more detail in Online Appendix A.1. 
2.3. Competitive equilibrium and threshold dependency ratio 
First we define the set of competitive equilibria. We then show that the dependency ratio can be calculated as the unique 
number supporting a specific competitive equilibrium. The threshold dependency ratio is then simply a special case. 
Definition 1. Competitive equilibrium. Given an initial aggregate endowment of assets a 0 = k 0 + b 0 , a government spending 
policy (g t , t r t = 
∑ J 
j=0 
μ j t r t− j, j , p t = 
∑ J 
j= j R 
μ j p t− j, j ) 
∞ 
t=0 , a tax policy ((q t, j , w t, j , r t, j ) 
J 
j = j 0 t 
) ∞ t= −J , a borrowing policy (b t+ J+1 ) 
∞ 
t= −J 
and a dependency ratio d = d((μ j ) 
J 
j=0 
, n, j R ) , a competitve equilibrium is a sequence of relative prices ( ̂  r t , ̂  wt ) 
∞ 
t=0 and indi- 
vidual allocations ((c t, j , l t, j , a t, j+1 ) 
J 
j = j 0 t 
) ∞ 
t= −J such that: 
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a) The sequence of individual allocations satisfies ()–(10) , for t ≥ −J; 
b) The sequence of relative prices satisfies (11) and (12) , for t ≥ 0; 
c) The dependency ratio and the sequence of government spending, tax and borrowing policies satisfy (13),(14) , and (16) for 
t ≥ 0, and (); 
d) All markets clear, i.e. (17) –(19) hold, for t ≥ 0; 
e) Feasibility (20) holds, for t ≥ 0. 
A competitive equilibrium is computed in two stages. The first consists in determining the sequence of individual allo- 
cations ( a ) and relative prices ( b ) that describe the private sector’s optimal choices. The sequence of individual allocations 
in ( a ) is determined taking as given government policy and two of the variables contributing to the determination of the 
dependency ratio in (1) , namely, the maximum life duration J and the age of retirement j R . 
8 In the second stage, government 
policy (spending, tax and borrowing) in ( c ) and aggregate variables in ( d and e ) are determined subject to the constraints 
set by the private sector choices, the dependency ratio and the government budget constraint. 9 It is at this second stage 
that all parameters of the dependency ratio enter the computation of the competitve equilibrium through the government 
budget constraint in (13) and (14) and the market clearing conditions. Crucially, one degree of freedom is missing at this 
stage, as the dependency ratio and the government policy need to satisfy the sequence of government budget constraints in 
(13) and (14) . As a result, there are many competitive equilibria, each indexed with a different dependency ratio and gov- 
ernment policy. This multiplicity implies that for any given fiscal policy, the dependency ratio can be derived as a residual 
from the solution of the government budget constraint. This, however, would not uniquely identify d , which is a highly non- 
linear combination of the demographic parameters J , (μ j ) 
J 
j=0 
, n and j R . The residual solution of the dependency ratio from 
the government budget constraint relies on the fact that the government can always choose at least one of the variables in 
Eq. (1) . As discussed in Section 2.1 , governments in advanced economies typically set the minimum age of retirement. 
To highlight the relation between changes in tax revenue and the dependency ratio, consider a government implementing 
a new tax policy that delivers a higher level of tax revenue. For this new policy to be supported as a competitive equilibrium 
the government budget constraint has to be satisfied. To this end, the additional tax revenue could be used to pay for a 
higher level of transfers to the existing cohort of retirees. It could also be used to maintain the current level of pensions 
per-capita while sustaining a higher number of beneficiaries of the pension system. In this second case, increases in tax 
revenue can be associated with higher dependency ratios, while still be compatible with a competitive equilibrium. The 
threshold dependency ratio is a special case, being the dependency ratio d obtained when tax policy is set to maximize tax 
revenue given government spending and borrowing policy. In other words, it measures the maximum number of retirees 
per worker that the government could sustain through tax policy alone. 
A maximum dependency ratio sustainable through changes in tax policy emerges naturally in a life-cycle model as long 
as there is an upper bound on tax revenue. This is provided by the DLE. The upper bound can be exploited in conjunction 
with the government budget constraint to give the threshold dependency ratio, d . 
Definition 1 implies that there is a competitive equilibrium where d = d . Still d is not uniquely determined being a 
nonlinear combination of the four parameters in Eq. (1) . The computation of the threshold dependency ratio used in this 
paper takes J , (μ j ) 
J 
j=0 
and j R as given in the second stage of the competitive equilibrium calculation, while determining 
Table 1 genously the growth rate of the population n . The threshold dependency ratio is therefore defined as follows. 
Definition 2. Threshold Dependency Ratio. Given an initial aggregate endowment of assets a 0 = k 0 + b 0 , a government 
spending (g t , t r t = 
∑ J 
j=0 
μ j t r t− j, j , p t = 
∑ J 
j= j R 
μ j p t− j, j ) 
∞ 
t=0 , consumption tax ((q t, j ) 
J 
j = j 0 t 
) ∞ 
t= −J and borrowing ( b t+ J+1 ) 
∞ 
t= −J pol- 
icy and a set of J , (μ j ) 
J 
j=0 
and j R , a threshold dependency ratio is a dependency ratio calculated from (1) for a competitve 
equilibrium such that: 
a) The sequence of individual allocations satisfies ()–(10) , for t ≥ −J; 
b) The sequence of relative prices satisfies (11) and (12) , for t ≥ 0; 
c) The social security budget (16) clear for t ≥ 0; 
d) The sequence of labor and capital tax policy ((w t, j , r t, j ) 
J 
j = j 0 t 
) ∞ 
t= −J maximizes (14) ; 
e) The growth rate of the population satisfy (13) , for t ≥ 0, and (15) ; 
f) All markets clear, i.e. (17) –(19) hold, for t ≥ 0; 
g) Feasibility (20) holds, for t ≥ 0. 
As noted above the threshold dependency ratio can be calculated as a residual from the government budget constraint. 
This requires measuring one of the parameters in (1) from the government budget constraint, while fixing all others. For 
this purpose we choose n , as this is numerically simpler to compute. In Online Appendix B we employ a restricted version 
of the model to derive a closed-form solution for the threshold and examine its main determinants more closely. 
We are interested in two statistics about the threshold. The first is the distance between any forecast of the dependency 
ratio at some point in the future, E t d t+ h , and the threshold dependency ratio at that point of time. The second is the 
8 Both J and j R could either be taken as given or included among the set of choice variables. 
9 The social security budget is already satisfied given j R . 
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Table 1 
Benchmark calibration. 
n d β κ α δ g / y tr / y b / y θ τ l τ k τ c τ p 
AUS 0.3 36.6 0.984 3.99 39 7.1 20 10.2 65 78.1 50 24 20 29 
BEL 0.5 33.8 0.970 5.14 39 8.4 24 14.9 107 46.6 49 42 17 16 
DNK 0.4 33.4 0.970 3.27 40 9.2 28 15.3 50 67.8 47 51 35 23 
FIN 0.4 35.7 0.966 3.96 34 7.0 24 16.4 46 55.8 49 31 27 20 
FRA 0.5 36.0 0.976 5.18 41 6.9 27 6.6 60 55.4 46 35 18 20 
GER –0.1 41.4 0.960 5.18 37 6.7 21 9.7 62 37.5 41 23 15 16 
GRE 0.1 40.6 0.984 3.36 40 6.1 20 1.7 100 66.7 41 16 15 27 
IRL 1.3 25.4 0.951 5.66 36 8.6 19 11.4 43 34.7 27 21 26 9 
ITA 0.2 40.0 0.981 5.03 39 7.0 21 7.1 110 69.5 47 34 15 28 
NET 0.5 35.1 0.992 5.8 38 7.7 27 –3.6 58 90.5 44 29 19 32 
PRT 0.1 38.1 0.974 3.4 39 9.8 23 –6.0 57 73.8 31 23 21 28 
ESP 0.7 27.7 0.982 5.17 42 8.5 21 –1.2 54 82.1 36 30 14 27 
SWE 0.5 35.9 0.975 2.99 36 4.8 30 14.4 58 56.0 56 41 21 20 
GBR 0.6 33.2 0.942 4.36 36 6.4 21 13.6 44 21.6 28 46 16 7 
USA 0.95 30.6 0.958 3.62 35 8.3 18 5.2 63 35.2 28 36 5 11 
Notes: Parameter values equal for all countries: ̂  r = 4% , η = 2 , ϕ = 1 and g A = 2% . All numbers are in percentage, 
other than β and κ . The survival probabilities are averages over 1990–2010. Age-productivity z j equal to 1 in all 
other countries other than in the USA. Data source is described in the main text. 
probability of reaching the threshold, or equivalently exhausting the distance, at some point in the future. Online Appendix C 
shows that the probability that the h -period ahead dependency ratio exceeds the threshold dependency ratio d , Pr 
(
d , t + h 
)
, 
can be written as 
Pr 
(
d , t + h 
)
= Pr 
[(
d − d t+ h 
)
≤ 0 
]
= Pr 
[
d − E t d t+ h 
σ
≤ u t+ h 
]
, (21) 
with u t+ h measuring innovations of the underlying process for d t+ h and σ being a measure of the uncertainty surrounding 
the forecasts of d t+ h . The probability Pr 
(
d , t + h 
)
can be computed for any stochastic distribution of the expected depen- 
dency ratio. We define the distance from the threshold, D 
(
d , t + h 
)
as the number of standard deviations that the h -period 
ahead dependency ratio is from the dependency ratio threshold d . 10 This is given by: 
D 
(
d , t + h 
)
= 
d − E t d t+ h 
ση,t+ h 
, (22) 
with ση,t+ h denoting the standard deviation of the h -period ahead innovation to d t+ h . The probability of exceeding the 
threshold dependency ratio Pr 
(
d , t + h 
)
is therefore a function of the distance from the threshold D 
(
d , t + h 
)
. It decreases as 
the gap between the threshold and the forecasted dependency ratios widens, and the uncertainty surrounding the depen- 
dency ratio forecast decreases. This probability changes over time due to changes in the base year and to new information 
which affect the forecast of the dependency ratio, its uncertainty and the threshold. 
To compute the distance and probability statistics we use two measures of the dependency ratio endorsed by the 
Nations (2015) . The first is the Old-Age Dependency Ratio 2 (OADR2), which measures the number of people in the pop- 
ulation aged 65 and above as a percentage of those aged between 20 and 64. The second is Old-Age Dependency Ratio 
3 (OADR3) which measures the number of people aged 70 and above as a percentage of those aged between 20 and 70. 
Online Appendix D describes these data in detail. 
3. Calibration 
3.1. Parameters 
As in Holter et al. (2018) , the parametrization of the model starts with a benchmark calibration that follows as closely 
as possible Trabandt and Uhlig (2011) . In this way, we can better appraise how DLEs in infinitely-lived-agent models change 
due to the life-cycle structure of the economy and aging. 11 
10 This is the analog of the distance-to-default in corporate finance, which is defined as the number of standard deviations that a firm is away from 
default. 
11 Although this calibration is based on assumptions that are fairly common in quantitative macro models on the effects of taxation, we note that other 
calibrations have been used in applied work on DLEs. For example, D’Erasmo et al. (2016) use a two-country model with a limited depreciation tax 
allowance and endogenous capacity utilization in order to better match empirical estimates of the capital income tax base short-run elasticity 
B. Heer, V. Polito and M.R. Wickens / Journal of Economic Dynamics & Control 116 (2020) 103913 9 
The benchmark calibration of the country-specific parameters is reported in Table 1 . The second column reports the an- 
nual growth rates of the population rate in each country, using the estimates of the Nations (2015) . To be consistent with 
Trabandt and Uhlig (2011) , who use 1995–2007 as the calibration period, we use the average population growth rate pre- 
vailing during the years 1990–2010. The 5-year survival probabilities for the 15 different age groups are taken from the 
Nations (2015) . These data show that survival probabilities have increased over time, and display larger rates of growth 
for the older age groups. For our benchmark simulation, we use the average survival probabilities during the period 1990–
2010. 12 The third column reports the equilibrium dependency ratios implied as residuals by these demographic variables in 
each country. The fourth column reports our estimate of the discount factor in each country. Trabandt and Uhlig (2011) cal- 
ibrate discount factors within the model so that the real interest rate equals 4 percent on an annual basis. As we are using 
an OLG model, we recalibrate β in each country to match a rate of interest of 21.9% over a period of 5 years, equivalent 
to 4% on an annual basis. The two preference parameters, η and ϕ, are taken from Trabandt and Uhlig (2011) . Thus, the 
intertemporal elasticity of substitution η−1 and the Frisch elasticity of labor supply ϕ are set to 1/2 and 1, respectively, for 
all countries. Consequently, the values of the parameter κ in the fifth column are calculated within the model to match the 
equilibrium average working hours, equal to 0.3 across countries. The production parameters in columns 6 and 7 are not af- 
fected by the OLG structure of the household sector, and are as in Trabandt and Uhlig (2011) . As in most of the OLG literature 
cited in the Introduction, the annual economic growth rate is kept constant over the simulation, set to 2% in all countries. 13 
The remaining columns report country-specific fiscal variables and aggregates. Government consumption-to-GDP and debt- 
to-GDP (columns 8 and 10 respectively) and the tax rates on labor, capital and consumption (columns 12–14) are taken 
directly from Trabandt and Uhlig (2011) . 14 Thus government transfers-to-GDP ratios in column 9 are determined within the 
model to satisfy the government budget constraint in each country. Pension replacement rates in column 11 are computed 
using data on the gross replacement ratios for pensions from the OECD (2015) . 15 The social security tax rates τ p in the 
last column are determined within the model to close the social security budget constraint in each country. Trabandt and 
Uhlig (2011) employ effective tax rates on labor income which already include social security contributions. We therefore 
restrict the tax rate on labor income in column 12 to have the same value of the labor tax rate τ l used by Trabandt and 
Uhlig (2011) , thus τ l = τw + τ p . We use the hump-shaped age-productivity profiles estimated by Hansen (1993) to measure 
the labor productivity z j for the United States. Labor productivity is set equal to 1 for all j ∈ (0, J ) in all other countries. 
16 
We employ the benchmark calibration to quantify DLEs and threshold dependency ratios in each country for 2010. The 
dynamic analysis of the evolution of threshold dependency ratio over the period 2010–2100 is carried out by retaining the 
benchmark calibration for preferences, production and government spending (consumption, transfers and the cost of debt 
servicing remain constant at their 2010 steady-state in proportion to GDP), while updating the demographic variables over 
time. In particular, for the projection of survival probabilities that serve as input into the calculation of the threshold over 
the period 2010–2100 we continue to use moving averages of 4 periods. For example, the threshold for 2015 is based on 
average survival probabilities during 1995–2015, the threshold for 2020 is based on average survival probabilities during 
20 0 0–2020, and so on. In each period over the projection horizon, tax rates on labor and capital income are set at their 
Laffer peaks, while the growth rate of the population is computed as the implied residual from the government budget 
constraint. The resulting equilibrium dependency ratio is thus the threshold, as in Definition 2 . Over the transition period 
2010–2100 the social security contribution rate τ p is adjusted to balance the social security budget. 
3.2. Computation and extensions 
The main focus of the analysis is to employ the threshold dependency ratio as a tool to evaluate the sustainability of 
public pension systems in aging economies. Quantitative studies employing large-scale OLG models are often concerned 
with the distributional effects of various forms of macroeconomic policy interventions. These studies therefore account for 
different forms of heterogeneity among agents (for example, with regard to income shocks, financial wealth distribution, 
education attainments, health, disability status, sex, marital status and household composition), other than age and produc- 
tivity. 
12 For reasons of space we do not report the survival probabilities. These are available upon request from the authors. 
13 In contrast, Heer and Irmen (2014) endogenize growth. In their model, firms have a higher incentive to invest in labor-saving technological progress if 
labor becomes scarcer (relative to capital). Again, the quantitative effect of aging on the growth rate is sensitive to the particular pension reform considered. 
They find that the average annual growth rate, which amounted to 1.74% during the period 1990–20 0 0, increases to 2.41% in 2100 when the replacement 
rate of pensions is held constant and financed by additional contributions. The effect could be larger if the contribution rate is frozen at its 20 0 0 level. 
14 Fève et al. (2013) find that the shape of the Laffer curve depends on the sign of the outstanding debt-to-GDP ratio, being ”S-shaped” when this is 
negative. We do not have this issue in our analysis since debt-to-GDP ratios are all positive the calibration reported in column 10. 
15 These are based on the percentage of pre-retirement income for men. 
16 No data is readily available on age-productivity profiles for the majority of European countries. Where there is no information, an alternative would 
be to use the age-productivity profile estimated from another European country. This would, however, be equally aribtrary. We re-calibrated the labor 
productivity age-profile in each European country using the labor-productivity estimates calculated for Germany by Heer and Maussner (2009) . The impact 
on the peaks of the Laffer curves and the thresholds is negligible because the revenue loss from those with productivity below 1, namely those aged 
between 20 and 39 (first four cohorts of workers) is in part offset by the revenue gain from those with productivity above 1, individuals aged between 40 
and 64 (last four cohorts of workers). These results for the European countries are not included for reason of space, but are illustrated as an example for 
the United States in footnote 19. 
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Table 2 
Tax rates on income from labor, income from capital and Fiscal Space (FS) at 
the peak of the Laffer hill, USA, 2010. 
τ l τ k τ p FS 
Benchmark 
28 36 11 –
Laffer 
Constant θ 63.6 47.3 11 46.9 
Constant p 60.0 34.5 15.7 31.8 
Notes: All numbers are in percentage. 
In our judgment, we can, without any loss of generality, dispense with most of these features when defining the thresh- 
old dependency ratio in Section 2.3. In principle, all these forms of heterogeneity could be included in our quantitative 
analysis, depending on the availability and comparability of these data for each country. Doing so would, however, add sig- 
nificantly to the computation time required in a multi-country analysis. We estimate that with existing computer technolo- 
gies and a version of the model including all the forms of heterogeneity described above, the solution of a single equilibrium 
takes not less than one hour, and iteration of the algorithm over the tax rates grid would take about four weeks. Added to 
this, the time required to iterate over the 2010–2100 period and for each country. Under our specification, the solution of a 
single equilibrium takes about one second and the search over the three-dimensional grid for τ l , τ k and d takes about two 
hours for each country, depending on the grid size and the number of years considered. Our specification is an attempt to 
balance the accuracy of the results with the feasibility of their computation. 17 
Nevertheless, in Section 6 , we consider the implications of four main extensions to the benchmark analysis: income 
heterogeneity among individuals, non-linear labor income taxation, labor choices at the extensive margin in retirement, 
variation in college attainment. 
For the purpose of the model solution demographic parameters evolve deterministically and policy action is known 
in advance with certainty. These are a common assumptions of most computational OLG models used to study the ef- 
fects of demographic transitions cited in the Introduction, see, e.g., Auerbach et al. (1983) , Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987) , 
De Nardi et al. (1999) , Kotlikoff et al. (2007) , Imrohoro ̆glu et al. (2016) and Ma and Tran (2016) . However, uncertainty about 
future demographic evolution, as well as the timing and type of policy intervention are also likely to be empirically signifi- 
cant. In Section 7 we discuss these possibilities in more detail as further avenues for extensions of the present analysis. 
4. United States 
4.1. Fiscal space 
We begin by quantifying the size of the fiscal space in the United States. Table 2 reports the tax rates on income from 
labor and capital at the peak of the Laffer hill in 2010, and the implied fiscal space ( FS ), being measured as the percentage 
increase of tax revenue when tax rates are at the peak of the Laffer hill relative to the benchmark. We consider two cases: 
a constant replacement ratio ( θ ) and a constant pension level ( p ). For convenience we also report the tax rates under the 
benchmark calibration. 18 The main result is that DLEs in a life-cycle model depend on how tax revenue is shared among 
retirees. This follows from the peaks of the Laffer curves. They are higher and the size of the fiscal space is larger for the 
case of constant replacement ratio because pensions fall in absolute value due to the higher tax rates and the government’s 
commitment to maintain a constant replacement ratio. According to life-cycle theory, this will cause workers to increase 
savings in order to smooth their consumption when retired. This leads to additional capital accumulation that partly offsets 
the negative effect of a higher tax burden. In contrast, when the pension level is fixed workers no longer need to increase 
saving. There is then no additional capital accumulation to partly offset the negative effect from a higher tax burden. Addi- 
tional capital accumulation is a feature specific to a life-cycle model; it is absent in an infinitely-lived agent model, where 
agents can change their labor supply in every period of their life. 
It is useful to relate the results in Table 2 to other studies. First, the tax rate on income from labor could be increased by 
as much as 115–130%. This increase is larger than the increases in the labor tax rate measured by De Nardi et al. (1999) or 
by Kotlikoff et al. (2007) . This is not surprising as these studies consider the additional tax burden required to sustain 
a given demographic structure, whereas the peak of the Laffer hill corresponds to the maximum tax burden sustainable 
for that demographic structure. Second, the rates of the labor income tax at the peak of the Laffer hill reach values similar 
(60%) to those calculated by Trabandt and Uhlig (2011) using a neoclassical growth model with infinitely-lived agents and by 
Holter et al. (2018) using an multi-period overlapping generations model. Third, when the government maintains a constant 
17 Online Appendix A describes the algorithm used for the numerical solution of the model. The GAUSS code implementing the algorithm is available 
upon request from the authors. 
18 The results in Table 2 are based on the hump-shaped age-productivity profile estimated by Hansen (1993) . The age-productivity profile, however, has 
little impact on the size of the fiscal space. For the case of constant θ , when assuming equal productivity for all agents the revenue-maximizing tax rates 
become 63.6% and 46.0% for τ l and τ k , respectively; τ p is still equal to 10.8%; additional tax revenues are equal to 46.4%. 
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Table 3 
Tax rates on income from labor, income from capital and Fiscal Space (FS) at 
the peak of the Laffer hill, USA, 2050. 
τ l τ k τ p FS 
d 2050 Constant θ
+ 2 s.e. 66.1 50.3 16.1 54.8 
Mean 64.8 49.7 14.4 60.3 
–2 s.e. 64.2 48.5 12.6 66.0 
Constant p 
+ 2 s.e. 61.2 33.9 21.1 37.6 
Mean 60.6 33.9 19.1 43.6 
–2 s.e. 60.6 33.3 17.2 49.5 
Notes: All numbers in percentage. 
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Fig. 1. Laffer curves on income from labor and capital, USA, 2010 and 2050. 
pension level the capital income tax rate is on the ”slippery” side of the Laffer hill beyond the peak, as also found by 
Trabandt and Uhlig (2011) . Unless it is explicitly stated, all subsequent results are based on the assumption of a constant 
replacement ratio. 
Table 3 shows how population aging impacts on DLEs. It reports the tax rates on labor and capital income and the 
fiscal space ( FS ) at the peak of the Laffer hill in 2050, using the mean forecast, the upper and lower two-standard-error 
bands for the 2050 dependency ratio. 19 For reference we also include the pension contribution rate that, due to population 
aging, has to increase to balance the social security budget. We highlight two main results. First, the size of the fiscal space 
declines the more pessimistic is the demographic projection. Second, for any given demographic forecast, the size of the 
fiscal space increases over time, from about 47% in 2010 (see Table 2 ) to 55–66% in 2050. This is because due to population 
aging tax revenue under the benchmark calibration declines more rapidly than the maximum tax revenue. Our analysis of 
the threshold dependency ratio in the next section illustrates to what extent a larger fiscal space is likely to sustain the 
increasing cost of the pension system in the United States. 
Fig. 1 displays the Laffer curves for labor and capital income taxes in 2010 (top panel) and 2050 (bottom panels). 20 
Laffer curves for the capital income tax are flatter than those for the labor income tax, as also found by Trabandt and 
Uhlig (2011) using a neoclassical growth model with infinitely-lived agents. This suggests that the slope of the Laffer curve 
is not qualitatively altered when accounting for the life-cycle structure of individuals in the economy. Comparison of the 
three panels shows that demographic uncertainty affects the position of the Laffer curve but does not significantly alter 
their shapes. 
In summary, these results highlight three dimensions of DLEs in the an OLG life-cycle model: (i) revenue-maximizing tax 
rates are higher when the government keeps the replacement ratio constant rather than the level of pensions, as this induces 
further private sector saving and capital accumulation which partly compensates for the negative effects of an increase in 
19 The equilibrium growth rate of the population is calculated as an implied residual from either the mean forecast, or the upper and lower two-standard- 
error bands of the 2050 dependency ratio. 
20 The lines for the labor (capital) income tax are obtained by varying the labor (capital) income tax rate while keeping τ k ( τ l ) constant at the value that 
maximizes total tax revenue. 
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Fig. 2. Threshold dependency ratio, USA, 2010–2100. 
taxation; (ii) population aging affects more the position of the Laffer curves than their shape; and (iii) uncertainty about 
demographic projections has a significant impact on the predicted position of Laffer curves. 21 
4.2. Threshold dependency ratio 
We compute a time series of the threshold dependency ratio that is directly comparable with the OADR projections 
of the Nations (2015) over the period 2010–2100 described in Online Appendix D. Due to population aging, the cost of 
current pension systems is expected to rise over time. We therefore consider the consequences of four different policy 
scenarios that are commonly suggested to make pension systems fiscally sustainable, for example De Nardi et al. (1999) , 
Kotlikoff et al. (2007) , Nishiyama and Smetters (2007) , Council (2012) and Conesa et al. (2016) . Under the first scenario the 
government maintains the replacement ratio of pension as in 2010 and finances increases in the cost of pensions over time 
by raising the social security tax rate τ p . This quantifies the threshold dependency threshold ratio under a scenario of no 
policy change, and is referred to as S1-NPC. The second scenario, S2-ICT, considers the effect of increasing the consumption 
tax rate by 5 percentage points, from 5 to 10% in the case of the United States. The third scenario, S3-RRR, considers the 
effect of reducing the replacement ratio of pensions by 10 percentage points, from 35.2 to 25.2% in the case of the United 
States. The fourth scenario, S4-IRA, considers the effect of increasing the retirement age to 70. 
Fig. 2 shows the evolution of the threshold dependency ratio under the four policy scenarios over the period 2010–2100. 
The dotted lines in the panels denote the dependency ratio forecasts (OADR2 for S1-NPC, S2-ICT and S3-RRR; OADR3 for 
S4-IRA). In 2010, the threshold dependency ratio under S1-NPC is about three times the actual dependency ratio. Doubling 
the consumption tax rate (S2-ICT) would change this only marginally. The threshold would be about 4 times higher than 
the actual dependency ratio following either a reduction in the replacement ratio by 10 percentage points (S3-RRR) or an 
increase in the retirement age to 70 (S4-IRA). 
Over the period 2010–2100, threshold dependency ratios increase, but very little. In contrast, the OADR2 and the OADR3 
are forecasted to increase very rapidly over the same period of time. Consequently, the gap between the forecasted depen- 
dency ratio and the threshold narrows under each policy scenario. The upper two-standard-error band of the forecast of 
the dependency ratio rises above the threshold under S1-NPC from 2085, but does not reach the threshold under the other 
three policy scenarios. 
Table 4 reports the threshold dependency ratios and the OARD2 and OADR3 forecasts for 2010, 2015, 2050 and 2100. 
On average, across the four policy scenarios, thresholds increase by about one percentage point between 2010 and 2015, by 
about three further percentage points until 2050, and by about two more percentage points by 2100. These increases are 
consistent with the increase in the size of the fiscal space over this period (compare Tables 2 and 3 ). Under S4-IRA both 
the threshold dependency ratio and the projected OADR3 are much lower. Therefore, the effects of the four policy scenarios 
are not comparable when considering the level of the thresholds in isolations, which motivates the use of our measures of 
distance and probability. 
Fig. 3 shows the evolution of the distance from the threshold and the probability of reaching the threshold under the 
four policy scenarios between 2050–2100. The distance declines under each policy scenarios due to the dependency ratios 
increasing more rapidly than the thresholds over the period 2050–2100, thereby reducing the numerator in Eq. (22) . The 
standard deviation of the forecast of the dependency ratio also increases, thereby increasing the denominator. The distance 
21 Online Appendix E provides a detailed description of the distributional impact of increasing the size of the fiscal space, by analyzing how DLEs impact 
on the distribution of the tax burden between workers and retirees, across different taxes and age cohorts. We find that as an economy moves towards the 
peak of the Laffer hill the tax burden shifts further towards workers, with the largest increase in tax revenue generated through the labor income tax. 
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Table 4 
Actual and threshold dependency ratios, USA, selected dates over 2010–2100. 
Actual/Forecasted 
Dependency Threshold Dependency Ratio ( d ) 
Ratio ( d ) 
Policy Scenarios: 
OADR2 OADR3 S1-NPC S2-ICT S3-RRR S4-IRA 
2010 21.6 14.1 60.4 65.7 79.0 57.3 
2015 24.7 15.1 60.9 66.6 80.2 58.0 
2050 40.7 28.3 63.3 69.2 83.3 60.9 
2100 53.4 38.6 65.0 71.0 85.5 63.0 
Notes: All numbers are in percentage. 
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Fig. 3. Distance from the threshold dependency ratio and probability of reaching the threshold, USA, 2050–2100. 
increases when moving from S1-NPC to S2-ICT to S3-RRR. This is consistent with the increases in the threshold levels 
under the three policies reported in Table 4 . The distance increases even more under S4-IRA. This implies that increasing 
the retirement age in the United States to 70 would improve the sustainability of the pension system more than would 
doubling the taxation of consumption or reducing the replacement ratio by 10 percentage points. 
Under S1-NPC, the probability of reaching the threshold is strictly positive from 2085 onwards and reaches about 4.5% by 
2100. This suggests that without any change in policy, there is a probability of about 5% that the cost of the pension system 
will become unsustainable in the United States over the medium and long run. Under S2-ICT, the probability of reaching the 
threshold is positive from 2090 onward, and reaches around 2.5%by 2100. For the other two policy scenarios, the threshold 
is reached with probability zero. 
4.3. Welfare analysis 
The choice of policy to increase the distance of the economy from the threshold could have significant welfare impli- 
cations. We therefore compare the implications of changing in 2010 the consumption tax rate, the replacement ratio of 
pension and the retirement age in order to deliver the same distance from the threshold dependency ratio by 2050. As 
shown in Fig. 3 , if the retirement age were to increase to 70 the distance from the threshold dependency ratio would be of 
about 17.66 standard deviations by 2050. The same distance would also result from an increase in the consumption tax rate 
to 25.4% or a reduction in the replacement ratio to 24.1% We refer to these two adjusted policy scenarios as S2A-ICT and 
S3A-RRR, respectively. 
We begin by calculating the average lifetime utility of the newborn in 2050 under S2A-ICT, S3A-RRR and S4-IRA, using 
the model equilibrium solution for 2050. In each policy scenario, the labor income tax rate and the pension contribution 
rate are adjusted to balance the general and the social security government budgets, respectively. We then compute the 
life-cycle profile of consumption and leisure over the 15 and 9 (10 under S4-IRA) lifetime periods. Instantaneous utility in 
each lifetime period and lifetime utility are then calculated using Eqs. (3) and (2) , respectively. 
Table 5 presents the values of aggregate consumption, aggregate labor, the tax rate on income from labor and welfare 
( U ) under the three policies for the 2050 newborn generation. The last row reports the percentage consumption equivalent 
change ( ) required for welfare under S4-IRA to be the same as under S2A-ICT and S3A-RRR. The results show that the 
policy reform based on increasing the consumption tax gives higher welfare than the policy based on reducing the replace- 
ment ratio or increasing the retirement age. This policy ranking arises from the tax rate on labor, which is lower under 
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Table 5 
Welfare of generations alive by 2050 under S2A-ICT, S3A-RRR 
and S4-IRA, USA. 
S2A-ICT S3A-RRR S4-IRA 
c 0.095 0.096 0.097 
l 0.230 0.233 0.238 
τ l 0.168 0.287 0.298 
U –102.78 –103.55 –107.07 
 + 4.17 + 3.40 
Notes: U is lifetime utility.  is percentage consumption equiv- 
alent change w.r.t. S4-IRA. 
Table 6 
Tax rates on income from labor, income from capital and Fiscal Space (FS) in 
percentage at the peak of the Laffer hill, EU14 countries, 2010. 
Country Benchmark Laffer 
Constant θ Constant p 
τ l τ k τ p τ l τ k FS τ l τ k τ p FS 
AUS 50 24 29 62 52 12.4 52 29 30 0.2 
BEL 49 42 16 59 47 3.1 53 34 16 0.3 
DNK 47 51 23 57 46 1.5 49 27 20 2.3 
FIN 49 31 20 60 45 4.6 53 26 21 0.3 
FRA 46 35 20 59 52 8.4 50 36 21 0.5 
GER 41 23 16 60 49 16.6 54 35 19 6.1 
GRE 41 16 27 62 52 37.3 52 30 34 7.8 
IRL 27 21 9 56 40 23.8 53 29 12 16.1 
ITA 47 34 28 64 51 14.3 53 30 36 0.9 
NET 44 29 32 69 53 31.5 59 26 38 6.0 
PRT 31 23 28 67 50 68.9 61 25 40 28.9 
ESP 36 30 27 64 53 44.0 55 29 35 1.0 
SWE 56 41 20 60 50 1.0 50 37 18 1.2 
GBR 28 46 7 57 43 15.7 54 36 9 11.2 
EU14 42 32 22 61 49 20 53 30 25 6.0 
USA 28 36 11 64 47 47 60 35 16 52 
Notes: All numbers are in percentage. EU14 is the arithmetic average. 
S2A-ICT compared to S3A-RRR and S4-IRA. This finding is similar to those of De Nardi et al. (1999) , Kotlikof et al. (2007) 
and Conesa et al. (2016) . Thus the policy that achieves the lowest distortion on the production factors brings also higher 
welfare gains. 
The above welfare analysis neglects the (potentially important) welfare effects while the economy is transiting between 
equilibria from 2010 to 2050. We address this issue in Online Appendix F, where we report the results from the simulation 
of the evolution of the United States economy as it transits between the 2010 and 2050 equilibria. This shows that reforms 
designed to improve the sustainability of the pension system in the United States bring welfare gains for all age groups 
in the long run, but only the young benefit in the short run. The welfare benefits increase over time. This reflects the 
advantages of having full information about policy changes and the ability to respond to them. The policy change that gives 
the greatest welfare gains (for all cohorts in the long run and for the young cohorts in the short run) is an increase in 
consumption taxes. 
5. EU14 countries 
In this section we extend our quantitative analysis of the threshold dependency ratio to the EU14 countries. First, we 
provide a cross-country comparison of the size of their fiscal space and highlight how this is related to differences in the 
labor tax rate, the replacement ratio, the dependency ratio and aging. Second, we present our measurement of the threshold 
(level, distance and probability) in each country under the same four policy scenarios considered for the United States. Third, 
we present the results from the welfare analysis. Given the large amount of data involved, we do not report the results 
for the transition experiments carried out on each individual country, but focus on the 2050 newborn generation. These 
allow a clear comparison of the effects of policy reforms across countries in the long run, while it is difficult to make any 
judgment looking at the transition profiles. We conclude our assessment considering the projected impact of pension policy 
reforms carried out by the EU14 countries on their thresholds using data from the 2018 Ageing Report of the European 
Commission. 
B. Heer, V. Polito and M.R. Wickens / Journal of Economic Dynamics & Control 116 (2020) 103913 15 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70
30
40
50
ESP
ITA
GER
FRA
GBR
SWE
BEL
NET
AUS
GRE
IRL
PRT
DNK
FIN
USA
et
ar 
x
at r
o
b
a
L
Labor tax rate vs. fiscal space
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70
20
40
60
80
100
ESP
ITA
GER
FRA
GBR
SWE
BEL
NET
AUS
GRE
IRL
PRT
DNK
FIN
USA
oi t
ar t
n
e
m
e
c
al
p
e
R
Replacement ratio vs. fiscal space
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70
15
20
25
30
35
ESP
ITA
GER
FRA
GBR
SWE
BEL
NET
AUS
GRE
IRL
PRT
DNK
FIN
USA
)
0
1
0
2(
2
R
D
A
O
2010 OADR2 vs fiscal space
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70
10
20
30
40
50 ESP
ITA
GER
FRA GBR
SWE
BEL
NET
AUS
GRE
IRL
PRT
DNK
FIN
USA
)
0
1
0
2(
2
R
D
A
O- )
0
5
0
2(
2
R
D
A
O
Change in OADR2 (2050 - 2010) vs. fiscal space
Fig. 4. Fiscal space in 2010 (constant replacement ratio) relative to (i) labor income tax rate, (ii) pension replacement ratio, (iii) 2010 OADR2 and (iv) 
change in the OADR2 over 2010–2050, EU14 countries. 
5.1. Fiscal space 
Table 6 reports the tax rates on labor income and capital at the peak of the Laffer hill and the size of the fiscal space 
( FS ) for each EU14 country assuming either a constant replacement ratio ( θ ) or a constant pension level ( p ) in 2010. 22 For 
reference we also report tax rates under the benchmark calibration. With a constant pension level, the payroll tax rate τ p 
adjusts to balance the social security budget. Numbers in bold indicate revenue-maximizing rates that are lower than the 
corresponding rates under the benchmark calibration. These highlight instances where current tax rates are higher than 
those at the peak of the Laffer hill, i.e. on the slippery side of the hill. 
The main result emerging from the table is that the revenue-maximizing tax rates and the size of the fiscal space are 
significantly higher in the case of constant replacement ratio. As for the United States, this is because pensions fall in 
absolute value as tax rates increase and the government maintains a constant replacement ratio. This induces workers to 
increase savings in order to smooth their consumption when retired, thereby leading to additional capital accumulation that 
is absent when the government maintains instead a fixed pension level. 
The results with a constant replacement ratio are generally in line with those of Trabandt and Uhlig (2011) . The labor 
income tax rates for all countries are lower than at the peak of the Laffer hill. For the capital income tax rate we find that 
only Denmark and Great Britain are on the slippery side of the Laffer hill. The average size of the fiscal space for the EU14 
countries in 2010 is 22%, less than half of that of the United States. There are, however, significant cross-country differences. 
Portugal has the largest fiscal space of about 70%; Belgium and the three Scandinavian countries have the lowest. 
The results for a constant pension level show that for the labor income tax, all countries but Sweden are below the peak 
and hence on the ”right” side of the Laffer hill. For the capital income tax rate, we find that 8 of the 14 countries have a 
tax rate higher than at the peak of the Laffer hill. The average size of the fiscal space with constant pensions is about a 
quarter of that with constant replacement ratio. Although there are still cross-country differences in the size of the fiscal 
space, these are less pronounced. 
Fig. 4 relates the fiscal space of the EU14 countries for a constant replacement ratio to the tax rate on labor income, the 
replacement ratio of pensions, the dependency ratio (OADR2 in 2010) and aging (change in the OADR2 between 2010 and 
2050). The United States is included for comparison. In each panel, the vertical line indicates the average fiscal space and 
the horizontal line is the average value of the variable on the vertical axis. 
The negative relation between the fiscal space and the labor tax rate in the top-left panel helps to explain the cross- 
country differences in the sizes of the fiscal spaces reported in Table 6 . 23 The top-right panel shows that the four EU14 
countries with the largest fiscal spaces (Portugal, Spain, Greece and the Netherlands) also have among the highest replace- 
ment ratios. Six countries (Austria, Denmark, Italy, Sweden, Finland and France) have high replacement ratios but relatively 
small fiscal spaces. The bottom-left panel shows a negative relation between the fiscal space and the age structure of the 
population in 2010. Eight countries are concentrated in the top-left corner of the panel. They have relatively high depen- 
dency ratios and narrow fiscal spaces. The four countries with the largest fiscal space also have relatively high dependency 
ratios. The bottom-right panel shows a positive relation between the size of the fiscal space and the increase forecasted in 
the OADR2 between 2010 and 2050. The four countries with the largest fiscal space are located towards the top-right corner. 
This suggests that countries which in 2010 have a relatively large fiscal space are likely to exhaust it relatively quickly. From 
22 As for the United States, we report our calculations for 2010 so that the results can be compared with those based on a neoclassical model with 
infinitely-lived agents reported by Trabandt and Uhlig (2011) . 
23 Differences in the size of the fiscal space across the EU14 countries is also related to the gap between the tax rate on income from capital under the 
benchmark calibration and at the peak of the Laffer hill. These are not reported for reason of space. 
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Fig. 6. OADR3 and thresholds under S4-IRA, EU14 countries, 2010–2100. 
this perspective, the fiscal outlooks for Italy, Austria and Germany are the most precarious as they have a relatively narrow 
fiscal space and are projected to age very rapidly over the period 2010–2050. 
In summary, when compared to the United States, the EU14 countries have, on average, narrower fiscal spaces, higher 
replacement ratios, higher dependency ratios and are expected to age much faster. 
5.2. Threshold dependency ratio 
Fig. 5 shows the evolution of the threshold dependency ratio in the EU14 countries over 2010–2100. In each panel, the 
dotted lines denote the OADR2 forecasts (mean and two-standard-deviation bands); the solid line denotes the threshold 
dependency ratio under the no-policy-change scenario (S1-NPC); the dashed-dotted and dashed lines denote the threshold 
obtained when the consumption tax rate is increased by 5 percentage points (S2-ICT) and the replacement ratio is reduced 
by 10 percentage points (S3-RRR), respectively. Fig. 6 shows the evolution of the threshold dependency ratio when the age 
of retirement is increased from 65 to 70 (S4-IRA) in each EU14 country together with the OADR3 forecasts over the period 
2010–2100. 
We find that under S1-NPC the majority of the EU14 countries have threshold dependency ratios below the mean forecast 
of the OARD2 for the largest part of the 2010–2100 period. Under S2-ICT and S3-RRR there is a very modest increase in the 
threshold in all EU14 countries, other than Great Britain. The outlook appears to improve under S4, though in no country is 
the threshold above the higher error band of the OADR3. 
Table 7 reports our estimate of the year when the OADR2 and OADR3 mean forecast are expected to be higher than the 
threshold dependency ratio for each EU14 country under the four policy scenarios. Under S1-NPC, the OADR2 is expected 
to overtake the threshold for all EU14 countries before 2100. Under S2-ICT, S3-RRR and S4-IRA the number of countries 
overtaking the threshold before 2100 reduces to thirteen, eleven and nine, respectively. The outlook is therefore particularly 
concerning for this last group of nine, that comprises Austria, Belgium, France, Italy, Greece, Spain and the three Scandina- 
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Table 7 
Years when forecasted dependency ratios are estimated to overtake the thresh- 
olds under S1-NPC, S2-ICT, S3-RRR and S4-IRA, EU14 countries. 
S1-NPC S2-ICT S3-RRR S4-IRA 
AUS 2030 2035 2035 2055 
BEL 2025 2030 2040 2055 
DNK 2025 2030 2035 2080 
FIN 2025 2025 2030 2080 
FRA 2025 2030 2040 2085 
GER 2035 2035 – –
GRE 2040 2045 2050 2085 
IRL 2075 2080 – –
ITA 2030 2030 2035 2040 
NET 2035 2035 2065 –
PRT 2045 2045 2070 –
ESP 2035 2040 2040 2050 
SWE 2025 2030 2075 2095 
GBR 2090 – – –
USA – – – –
Notes: ‘-’ indicates threshold not reached before 2100. 
Table 8 
Distance from the threshold and probability of reaching the threshold, EU14 
countries, 2050. 
S1-NPC S2-ICT S3-RRR S4-IRA 
D Pr D Pr D Pr D Pr 
AUS –5.22 100 –4.22 100 –3.29 99.9 0.13 1.7 
BEL –5.11 100 –3.68 100 –1.58 95.2 0.01 47.5 
DNK –2.76 99.7 –1.69 94.8 –1.68 70.6 1.56 5.4 
FIN –3.61 100 –2.39 99 –0.81 79.3 2.08 2.3 
FRA –3.68 100 –2.39 99.5 –0.22 56.7 1.72 5.5 
GER –2.81 98.9 –0.96 84.2 1.79 4.9 2.66 0.9 
GRE –4.07 100 –3.09 99.9 –1.57 95.4 1.76 4.8 
IRL –0.85 80.5 1.02 15.2 4.88 0 6.17 0 
ITA –6.79 100 –5.9 100 –4.85 100 –2.86 99.9 
NET –1.71 95.9 –0.96 84.2 0.23 41.3 3.1 0 
PRT –2.06 99.3 –1.4 92.8 0.27 37.9 3.03 0 
ESP –7.07 100 –6.12 100 –5.13 100 –1.99 98.1 
SWE –2.65 99.7 –1.13 87.6 0.98 15.7 3.02 0.2 
GBR 2.95 0 5.4 0 12.17 0 8.82 0 
EU14 –3.25 91.0 –1.97 82.7 0.09 56.9 2.09 19.0 
USA 8.78 0 11.12 0 16.61 0 17.7 0 
Notes: All numbers for Pr are in percentage. 
vian countries. On average, under S1-NPC these nine countries are expected to overtake the threshold by 2030. This date is 
postponed by 5, 15 and 40 years under S2-ICT, S3-RRR and S4-IRA, respectively. 
Table 8 reports the distance from the threshold and probability of reaching the threshold in each EU14 country in 2050 
under the four policy scenarios. The last two rows report the EU14 average and the United States for reference. Under S1- 
NPC, for all countries other than Great Britain the distance from the threshold in 2050 is negative implying the dependency 
ratio exceeds the threshold. The distance is still negative under S2-ICT, though on average smaller than S1-NPC. It becomes 
positive on average under S3-RRR and S4-IRA. The probability of reaching the threshold by 2050 declines on average from 
about 90 to about 20% when moving from S1-NPC to S4-IRA. In contrast, there is a zero probability of the United States 
reaching the threshold by 2050 even under the scenario of no change in policy. These results highlight how pressing reforms 
of the pension system are in the EU14 countries. They also highlight that the extent of these reforms in EU14 countries 
should be more radical than for the United States. 
5.3. Welfare analysis 
Table 9 reports our results on the welfare effects of alternative policy changes that are designed to satisfy the threshold 
dependency ratio for the EU14 countries based on the lifetime utility of the 2050 newborn generation. The first two columns 
report for each country the targeted distance from the threshold in 2050 and the corresponding probability (these are the 
same as in the last two columns of Table 8 ). The next two columns report the tax rate on consumption and the pension 
replacement ratio required to achieve the targeted distance in each country under S2A-ICT and S3A-RRR, respectively. The 
last two columns report the percentage consumption change ( ) required for welfare under S4-IRA to be equal to welfare 
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Table 9 
Consumption compensations across cohorts required for S2A-ICT and 
S3A-RRR to yield same equilibrium lifetime utility as under S4-IRA, 
EU14 countries, 2050. 
S4-IRA S2A-ICT S3A-RRR 1 2 
D Pr τ c θ
AUS 0.13 1.7 46 56 1.49 1.78 
BEL 0.01 47.5 34 33 –0.23 2.42 
DNK 1.56 5.4 55 51 –8.79 –4.15 
FIN 2.08 2.3 50 39 –1.36 2.66 
FRA 1.72 5.5 39 41 –0.36 –1.18 
GER 2.66 0.9 36 25 3.27 4.49 
GRE 1.76 4.8 46 47 13.43 7.97 
IRL 6.17 0 45 23 1.23 1.20 
ITA –2.86 99.9 41 49 
NET 3.10 0 48 71 –4.45 –8.01 
PRT 3.03 0 55 57 1.52 –3.36 
ESP –1.99 98.1 44 60 
SWE 3.02 0.2 40 42 24.2 –1.45 
GBR 8.82 0 28 15 0.40 1.77 
EU14 2.09 19.0 43 43 
USA 17.7 0 25 25 4.17 3.40 
under S2A-ICT and S3A-RRR, respectively. The results for the United States are also reported in the last row for comparison. 
Welfare calculations are not provided for Italy and Spain as the distance remains negative for these two countries. We 
highlight two main results. 
First, the increases in the consumption tax rate and/or reduction in the replacement ratio required to achieve the targeted 
distances are significantly higher than those calculated for the United States. The average consumption tax rate under the 
benchmark calibration of the twelve countries that have a positive distance is about 21%. This needs to increase on average 
across these countries to 43%. Similarly the replacement ratio needs to be reduced from 57 to 43%, on average. 
Second, the welfare ranking for the three policy reform scenarios is very different across countries. In particular, partial 
financing using the consumption tax, which is the preferred policy change for the United States, does not yield the higher 
long-run welfare gains for the majority of EU14 countries. The policy reform S3A-RRR yields higher welfare gains in the long 
run for Austria, Belgium, Finland, Germany and Great Britain, while S4-IRA yields higher welfare gains for Denmark, France 
and the Netherlands. 
To shed light on some of the factors determining these cross-country differences in the welfare ranking, we calculate 
how the measured consumption compensations correlate with the deep parameters that determine the distance from the 
threshold in each country. 24 
Several patterns emerge. Policy reforms based on increasing the taxation of consumption tend to yield higher welfare 
gains in countries with relatively high debt-to-GDP ratios. Under this policy the government can reduce the level of public 
spending since the equilibrium stock of capital is high, thus leading to a reduction in the cost of servicing public debt. 
Policy reforms based on a reduction in pension contributions tend to be preferred to those based on higher taxation of 
consumption in countries where the taxation of income from labor is relatively high, since the consumption tax rate has the 
effect of further increasing the tax wedge. For the same reason, in countries with relatively high taxation of income from 
labor, policy reforms based on the reduction of pension contributions tend to be preferred also to those based on increasing 
the retirement age. 
Cross-country differences are also affected by differences in discount factors and the taxation of saving. Under policy 
S4-IRA there is a reduction in public transfers at age 65–70 (the pension for the cohort that is required to work under S4- 
IRA). Under policy S3-RRR, there is on average a reduction in transfers at a later point in life for those age 65–95. Different 
discount factors across countries weight these two policies differently. For any given policy, individuals in countries with 
high capital tax rates have lower consumption than those living in countries with low capital tax rates in order to build up 
their savings. Accordingly, for a lower discount rate and capital income tax rate, policy S3-RRR is preferred to policy S4-IRA. 
5.4. EU14 Pension policy reforms 
European countries have carried out substantial reforms to enhance the long-term sustainability of their pension systems 
over the last twenty years. Most of these reforms have modified pension system rules and parameters to reduce the future 
generosity of pension benefits. Carone et al. (2016) explain how one of the common elements of pension reforms across 
the European countries has been the introduction of mechanisms that automatically index key pension parameters, like 
24 We considered tax rates ( τ c , τ k , τ l , τ p ), preferences and production parameters ( β , κ , α, δ), fiscal expenditure variables and parameters ( g / y, tr / y, b / y, 
θ ), the size of the 65-70-year cohort, the OADR2 and OADR3 in 2010, and the change in both of these between 2010 and 2050. 
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Fig. 7. OADR2 and thresholds under S1-NPC, EU14 countries, 2010–2100. Thresholds under S5-PBR and S5-PRR, EU14 countries, 2015–2070. 
retirement age or benefit payments, to demographic changes. According to the 2018 Ageing Report, 25 these reforms are 
expected to determine sizable decreases in the projected pension generosity of many EU14 countries, thereby stabilizing 
their pension spending as a share of GDP over the long term. The impact of these reforms is captured, among the others, 
by (the projected change of) two indicators: the benefit ratio of public pensions and the replacement rate at retirement. 
The benefit ratio is a measure of the average pension in relation to the average wage. For this reason it captures the overall 
impact of current and future reforms of the pension system, including indexation, on pension payments. The replacement 
rate is an additional indicator that focuses on the average first pension as a share of the economy-wide average wage at 
retirement. 26 
According to the 2018 Ageing Report, benefit ratios and replacement rates are due to decline on average across EU14 
countries by 11.3 and 8.9%, respectively, by 2070. There are however widespread country differences. The largest reductions, 
in percentage points between 2015 and 2070, are projected for Portugal, Spain, Greece, Italy and France. For the other 
countries, reductions are generally more modest and in some countries these indicators are projected to increase in the 
short term, before eventually declining by 2070. 
To incorporate the effects of EU14 pension policy reforms in the measurement of the threshold dependency ratio we 
proceeded as follows. First we used the data in the 2018 Ageing report to calculate the rates of change of the projected 
benefit ratio and the replacement rate over 2015–2070. Second, we applied these rates of change to our estimate of the 
replacement ratio θ in Table 1 . This gives two time series mapping the evolution of θ implied by the projected pension 
policy reforms described in the 2018 Ageing Report. 27 We then recomputed the threshold dependency ratio in each EU14 
country using these time-varying estimates of θ between 2015 and 2070. 
The results from this simulation are reported in Fig. 7 . The threshold dependency ratio under the scenario that the 
replacement ratio θ evolves in each country according to the projected changes of the benefit ratio is denoted as S5-PBR 
(red-dashed lines). The scenario in which the replacement ratio θ evolves in each country according to the projected changes 
of the replacement rate is denoted as S5-PRR (red-solid line). For each country the corresponding OADR2 (black-dotted line) 
and the threshold S1-NPC (solid-black line) are also included for reference. 28 
Four main patterns can be observed from Fig. 7 . First, in all EU14 countries, other than Great Britain, the threshold depen- 
dency ratio increrases relative to S1-NPC under both S5 scenarios, at least in the long run (2070). This reflects the fact that 
pension reforms are projected to achieve reduction of the cost of pension in most countries. It is noticeable however how 
the increase of the threshold under both S5 scenarios is generally modest across countries, being just sufficient to reach the 
median projected OADR2. Second, in most countries (other than Belgium, the Netherlands and Great Briain) the thresholds 
dependency ratio under either S5-PRR or S5-PBR, if not both, appear to follow an increasing trend in line with that of the 
OADR2. This reflects the impact of the indexation machanisms introduced by european countries on the projected cost of 
pensions, which is captured by the change in time-varying series for θ over 2015–2070. Third, the thresholds under S5-PBR 
tend to overlap with those under S5-PRR for most countries over the 2015–2070 period. The main exceptions are Greece and 
25 See EPC (2018) . 
26 For both of these indicators, the 2018 Ageing Report provides projections between 2016 and 2070, see Table III.1.81 and Table III.1.82 for the benefit 
ratio and the replacement rate, respectively. 
27 The threshold could be computed using directly the data on benefit ratios and replacement rates provided in the 2018 Ageing Report. The results 
however would not be directly comparable with those in the rest of the paper. 
28 The 2018 Ageing Report includes no data for the United States and for the projected replacement rate for the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. 
For this reason, the corresponding thresholds are omitted in Fig. 7 . 
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Table 10 
Threshold dependency ratio (level, distance and probability) under benchmark 
(upper part) and income heterogeneity (income heterogeneity), USA, GER, ITA 
and ESP, 2050. 
USA GER ITA ESP 
Threshold Benchmark 
d 63.3 55.4 47.8 50.7 
D 8.78 –2.30 –6.84 –7.07 
Pr 0 99.1 100 100 
Threshold Heterogeneous income 
d 58.2 56.2 48.8 42.3 
D 6.90 –2.06 –6.59 –9.31 
Pr 0 98.4 100 100 
Notes: All numbers for d and Pr are in percentage. 
Portugal, for which the threshold under S5-PBR is well above the threshold under S5-PRR and close to the upper confidence 
bands of the OADR2 for most of the 2015–2070 period. The opposite can be observed for Italy. The difference between the 
two S5 thresholds reflects the fact that decrease in the pension cost achieved through reduction in the replacement rates at 
retirement could be either compounded or partially offset by changes in other rules of the pension systems. 
6. Extensions 
We study the implications of four possible extensions of the benchmark model. These extensions reflect different features 
of other studies that might have the greatest impact on our results. The four extensions are (i) income heterogeneity among 
individuals, (ii) non-linear labor income taxation such as progressive taxation, (iii) labor supply choice at the extensive 
margin associated with the age of retirement and the costs of early retirement, and (iv) increase in college attainments. 
Fehr et al. (2013) and Holter et al. (2018) are examples of life-cycle models that account, among others, for the 
first three extensions simultaneously. Guner et al. (2016) develop a life-cycle model with heterogeneity and non-linear 
taxes, but without labor supply decisions at the extensive margin. Cooley and Henriksen (2018) use a life-cycle model 
including heterogeneous individuals, labor supply decisions at the extensive margin, but without a government sector. 
Kitao (2014) uses a life-cycle model with heterogeneous individuals, choice at the extensive margin and proportional tax- 
ation. Conesa et al. (2019) show that increase in college education would be beneficial for the financing of the pension 
system. 
Our analysis differs from these studies as we cover a wider range of countries, whose economies are simulated under 
four different policy scenarios based on demographic shifts over the whole 2010–2100 period. For reasons of computational 
tractability and space, it is not feasible to carry out a quantitative analysis of all of these extensions simultaneously for each 
of the 15 countries in our study. We therefore carry out a more limited analysis designed to indicate the likely effects of each 
of the extensions on our measure of the threshold (level, distance and probability). Additional details on the specification, 
calibration, solution and computation of the model under each of these extensions are provided in Online Appendix G. 
6.1. Income heterogeneity 
Income heterogeneity among individuals is introduced following Holter et al. (2018) and Cooley and Henriksen (2018) . 
Wages are assumed to depend on an aggregate factor, the aggregate wage per efficiency unit of labor ̂ w, and an individual- 
specific productivity factor ω. The latter varies over the life cycle and across individuals due to changes in an individual-age 
z j , differences in efficiency ǫ and, over time, to idiosyncratic shocks to individual’s productivity u t . As is usual in the OLG 
literature, we specify ω( j, ǫ, u t ) = ǫz j e 
u t . The stochastic component u t follows an AR(1) process u t+1 = ρu t + ε t+1 , where εt 
is identically and independently normally distributed with zero mean and constant variance, i.e. ε t ∼ N(0 , σ 2 ε ) . Accordingly, 
the pre-tax wage income of an individual with characteristics ( j , ǫ, u t ) is given by ω( j, ǫ, u t ) ̂  wt l t, j . The permanent efficiency- 
type, given by ǫ ∈ { ǫ1 , ǫ2 }, captures differences in education and ability among individuals. The remaining specification of 
the model is unchanged. We re-calibrate this new version of the model with heterogeneous individuals for four countries, 
the United States, Germany, Italy and Spain, making sure that the model still matches the same aggregate moments as 
under the benchmark calibration for 2010. We then update this to the demographic shift projected for 2050. Our results 
are presented in Table 10 . For convenience, the upper part of the table reports for each country the thresholds level d , the 
distance D as in (22) , and the probability Pr as in (21) obtained under the benchmark analysis. The bottom part shows the 
corresponding results when accounting for income heterogeneity. 
We make two main observations. First, once accounting for income heterogeneity, the threshold levels change across 
countries without any regular pattern in terms of signs and magnitudes. Second, due to the uncertainty about demographic 
forecasts, the calculated changes in the threshold levels cause only small variations in the distance and have negligible 
effects on the probability of reaching the threshold by 2050. For the United States and Spain, the threshold dependency 
ratios fall from 63.3 to 58.2% and 50.7 to 42.3%, respectively. The associated distance from the mean-projected dependency 
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Table 11 
Tax rates on income from labor, tax revenue as a proportion to GDP and so- 
cial security tax revenue as a proportion to GDP in the benchmark model (up- 
per part) and in the model with heterogeneous income, USA, GER, ITA and ESP, 
2050. 
USA GER ITA ESP 
Benchmark 
τ p 22.3 21.0 33.3 36.9 
τw 36.3 34.6 20.5 16.7 
˜ tax t /GDP 40.6 34.4 36.7 33.4 
̂ wt l t τ p /GDP 14.5 13.2 20.3 21.4 
Heterogeneous income 
τ p 16.8 17.5 35.2 25.4 
τw 30.6 39.1 20.9 23.0 
˜ tax t /GDP 33.0 36.3 34.4 35.8 
̂ wt l t τ p /GDP 10.7 11.0 21.5 14.7 
Notes: All numbers are in percentage. 
ratio is reduced in both countries by about 1.5 standard deviations, while the probability of reaching the threshold remains 
unchanged. In the cases of Germany and Italy, the thresholds increase, though by a small amount, from 55.4 to 56.2% and 
47.8 to 48.8%, respectively. These results reflect two opposing effects of income uncertainty on the aggregate supply of labor, 
which in turn alter the size of the fiscal space and the threshold. First, due to income uncertainty, households increase their 
supply of labor in order to build up precautionary saving. This increases the size of the fiscal space and the level of the 
threshold. But, second, the higher supply of labor generates a higher fiscal revenue, which brings about higher lump-sum 
transfers to the households and higher levels of government consumption (which we calibrated to match the empirical ratio 
with output). Governments therefore need to further increase distortionary taxation to finance higher levels of transfers 
and public consumption. This crowds-out the effect of the higher supply of labor, in turn reducing the fiscal space and the 
threshold. Consequently, when comparing the resulting threshold dependency ratios with those from the benchmark model, 
we are comparing the effects of aging in two models that have different values of G and tr. 
Table 11 reports the tax parameters at the threshold levels in 2050 under both the benchmark calibration (upper part) 
and with income heterogeneity (lower part). These help explaining the key drivers of the results reported in Table 10 . In 
particular, the sum of τ p and τw is the tax rate on labor income at the peak of the Laffer curve, while the sum of ˜ tax t /GDP 
and ̂ wt l t τ p /GDP is the total tax revenue as a proportion to GDP generated by the government at the threshold, with ̃  tax t /GDP 
denoting total tax revenue in the government budget as a proportion to GDP and ̂ wt l t τ p /GDP denoting social security tax 
revenue as a proportion to GDP. In the benchmark model, which has homogenous cohorts without income uncertainty, tax 
rates on labor income at the peak of the Laffer curve vary across the four countries between about 54 and 59%. The total 
tax revenue as a proportion to GDP raised at the threshold ranges between about 48 and 57% across the four countries. 
After accounting for income heterogeneity, the peak of the Laffer curve falls for the United States and Spain by about 11 
and 5 percentage points, respectively, while it marginally increases for Germany and Italy by about 2 percentage points. 
Consequently total tax revenue as a proportion to GDP falls significantly in the United States and Spain, while it is almost 
unchanged for the other two countries. This is why the thresholds of the United States and Spain fall significantly relatively 
to the benchmark, while are almost unchanged for Germany and Italy. In Spain, the reduction of total tax revenue as a 
proportion to GDP is characterized by a different composition compared to that of the United States. This is because the 
fall in the labor income tax rate at the peak of the Laffer curve in Spain is driven by the large fall in the social security 
contribution tax rate (from 36.9 to 25.4%). This explains why reduction of the social security revenue in Spain (from 21.4 to 
14.7%) is larger than that for the United States (from 14.5 to 10.7%). 
To explain the opposing effect of heterogeneity on the tax share ( ̃  tax t /GDP ) in the United States versus Spain, a drop 
from 40.6 to 33% in the United States versus a rise from 33 to 36% in Spain (even though the threshold dependency ratio 
shrinks in both countries), it is necessary to take into account the different effects that the pension system has in these 
two countries. In both countries, aggregate savings go up in the case of heterogeneity because income-rich households save 
a higher proportion of their income than income-low households. 29 Therefore, the capital-output ratio increases in both 
countries. The rise of this ratio, however, is much stronger in the United States than in Spain. This is because public saving 
in the United States is lower than in Spain, given that the replacement ratio is 35.2% in the United States and 82.1% in 
Spain. As capital deprecation is tax deductable, a smaller portion of GDP, ( Y − δK)/ Y , is therefore subject to income taxation 
in the United States following the increase in K / Y . Therefore, the tax revenue share also falls in the United States while this 
increases in Spain (where, in addition, the wage tax rate τw also increases). 
29 Huggett and Ventura (20 0 0) show that this result holds both empirically and in the standard OLG model with heterogeneous households. 
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Table 12 
Threshold dependency ratio and associated tax values in the model with het- 
erogeneous income and progressive income taxation under different values of 
the Frisch elasticity of labor and tax progressivity, USA, 2050. 
Frisch elasticity ( ϕ) 1 1 0.6 
Tax Progressivity ( θ1 ) 0.2036 0.1106 0.1106 
Threshold 
d 43.7 48.9 55.9 
D 1.17 3.22 5.99 
Pr 15.2 0 0 
Tax statistics 
τ p 13.6 14.7 16.5 
τw 21.09 20.08 20.9 
˜ tax t /GDP 25.7 28.8 29.0 
̂ wt l t τ p /GDP 8.9 9.7 11.8 
Notes: All numbers are in percentage, other than those for D . 
6.2. Non-linear taxation of labor income 
The second extension considers the effects of non-linear taxation, as in Benabou (2002) , Heathcote et al. (2017) , Heer and 
Scharrer (2018) and Holter et al. (2018) . In particular, we adopt the approach of the latter and maintain the assumption that 
the capital income tax, the social security contribution and the consumption tax are levied at flat rates, while labor income 
is taxed progressively. 
It is important to highlight that the household sector in the benchmark model is specified in terms of single individuals 
and that pension replacement ratios are calibrated on data for single men. As a result, the benchmark model abstracts from 
two characteristics of the population that are important when fully quantifying the effects of nonlinear taxation, namely, 
the distinction between men and women (which implies different labor market participation rates and Frisch elasticities of 
labor supply), and the marital status of individuals. 30 While not accounting for these features explicitly in our model, we 
try to elucidate their likely effects on the threshold through a sensitivity analysis. 
To model the non-linear taxation of labor income, we denote by ̂ y = Aω( j, ǫ, u t ) ̂  wl the pre-tax labor income of an in- 
dividual with age j , with permanent productivity ǫ, idiosyncratic labor productivity u and labor supply l . After-tax labor 
income y is formulated as y = θ0 
(
̂ y
ȳ 
)1 −θ1 
ȳ , where ȳ is average income among workers and the parameters θ0 and θ1 de- 
note tax-level and tax-progressivity, respectively. This form of the tax function has the advantage that the tax level can be 
varied by changing θ0 without affecting the extent of tax progressivity θ1 . The tax burden on an individual labor income is 
given by T ( ̂  y ) = ̂  y − y and this replaces τw in the individual and government budget constraints. The remaining specification 
of the model is unchanged. The model is calibrated for the United States. The tax function is calibrated using the estimates 
of θ1 from Holter et al. (2018) and θ0 is set to match the average labor income tax rate τ
w , as in our benchmark model. 
We retain the specification of income heterogeneity described in Section 6.1 . 
Table 12 presents the results obtained from three different simulations involving progressive taxation. In the first, we 
consider the extent of tax progressivity for the case of a married couple with two children, θ1 = 0 . 2036 , while retaining 
the same Frisch elasticity of labor supply used by Trabandt and Uhlig (2011) , ϕ = 1 . In the second simulation, we reduce 
tax progressivity while leaving the elasticity of labor supply unchanged. Accordingly, the value of the tax progressivity pa- 
rameter for single men is that used in Holter et al (2018), θ1 = 0 . 1106 , which we regard as being more consistent with the 
specification and calibration of the benchmark model. In the third simulation, we consider the effect of reducing the Frisch 
elasticity of labor supply while leaving progressivity unchanged. To this end we re-calibrated the model with a value of the 
Frisch elasticity of 0.6, which is in between that for men (0.4) and women (0.8), that was used by Holter et al. (2018). We 
retained θ1 = 0 . 1106 . 
The results show that, in general, tax progressivity reduces the threshold level. This is consistent with the finding of 
Holter et al. (2018) that the more progressive the tax system, the smaller is the fiscal space (compare columns 2 and 3). 
Further, Holter et al. (2018) find that the effect of tax progressivity on the fiscal space depends on the sensitivity of labor 
supply to changes in tax rates. This result is also reflected in our final simulation (compare columns 3 and 4) as the thresh- 
old increases once the Frisch elasticity is aligned to the average between men and women, and reaches levels in line with 
those reported in Table 10 . Under this final simulation, the distance reduces by about 0.9 standard deviations relative to the 
case of income heterogeneity and proportional taxation, while the probability is still unchanged. 
30 Holter et al. (2018) quantify the significance of these features for the analysis of progressive tax systems and DLEs. 
B. Heer, V. Polito and M.R. Wickens / Journal of Economic Dynamics & Control 116 (2020) 103913 23 
Table 13 
Effects of early retirement on the threshold, USA, 2050. 
Financial penalty 0 13.33 25 
People retiring 
between age 60–64 74.9 31.77 0.40 
Threshold 
d 39.0 46.8 57.7 
D –0.68 2.40 6.71 
Pr 76.9 0 0 
Notes: All numbers are in percentage other than D . 
6.3. Extensive margin 
The benchmark specification of the model allows for labor decisions at the intensive margin in each period up to the 
age of retirement of 65 − 69 , after which individuals no longer work. This follows a protocol common in the computational 
OLG literature. Recent examples include Conesa and Garriga (2016) and Guner et al. (2016) . Before discussing the effects for 
our analysis of allowing labor supply choices at the extensive margin, three preliminary observations are necessary. 
First, we note that the age of retirement 65 − 69 is a close approximation to the average legal (and effective) age of 
retirement observed in the 15 countries covered in our quantitative analysis. According to OECD data, the legal age of retire- 
ment is 65 in the United States and on average 63.4 across the EU14 countries while, the average effective age of retirement 
is 67 in the United States and 63.9 in the EU14 countries. The gap between the effective and legal retirement age is typically 
narrow across countries. Notable exceptions are Portugal (6.6) and France (-4.5). 31 These discrepancies between countries are 
due to pension provisions that allow individuals to take both early and late retirement. The fact that the effective retirement 
age is higher than the legal age reflects in part the financial cost of early retirement. 32 
Second, the quantitative significance of labor market choices at the extensive margin is unclear. Fehr et al. (2013) and 
Kitao (2014) specify life-cycle models where individuals also make labor choices at the extensive margin. These works find 
that labor market choices at the extensive margin can have significant aggregate effects, in particular, once heterogeneity 
in health status is accounting for. However, Holter et al. (2018) find that labor decisions at the extensive margin have a 
less significant impact on macroeconomic aggregates, once differences in labor market participation (and Frisch elasticities) 
between men and women and family composition (single, married couple and married couple with children) are accounting 
for. 
Our third observation is that the results from the benchmark analysis can already be used to infer the likely effects on 
the threshold of the observed discrepancies between the legal and the effective age of retirement. Thus it is sufficient to 
compare the distances and probabilities under S1-NPC and S4-IRA for 2050 in Table 8 . The threshold distance/probability 
under S4-IRA can be interpreted as the consequence of everybody in the economy retiring at age 70. The corresponding 
results under S1-NPC refer to when everybody retires instead five years earlier, at age 65. In general, this shows that early 
(late) retirement would increase (reduce) the pension cost, as individuals spend longer (shorter) time in retirement, and also 
negatively (positively) affect the financing of the pension system, as people spend a shorter (longer) life-time working. We 
note that these results are based on the assumption that people can retire earlier without incurring any financial penalty, 
which is not the case under the pension provisions of most OECD countries. We would expect that the cost of retiring earlier 
would be a discouragement from doing so, particularly for those with high earnings. 
To evaluate the significance of having both the intensive and extensive margin, we extended the benchmark specification, 
by modelling retirement as endogenous as in Fehr et al. (2013) . In particular, we re-computed the solution for 2050 assum- 
ing that individuals can choose whether to retire at the age of 65 (corresponding to j R = 10) or at the early retirement age 
of 60 (corresponding to j ER = 9). If an individual retires early, he/she can spend more time on leisure, but his/her (remaining 
lifetime) income declines. The resulting optimization problem is a binary choice between the values associated with early 
and regular retirement. The individual chooses to retire if 
V ER ( a, 9 , ǫ, u ) > V R ( a, 9 , ǫ, u ) , 
where V ER ( V R ) denotes the value function of the household at age j = 9 with assets a , permanent productivity ǫ, and 
stochastic productivity u in the case of early (regular) retirement. We further assume that individuals decide upon early 
retirement at the beginning of the period at age j = 9 after observing the stochastic productivity shock u . The model is 
calibrated on data for the United States for the demographic structure in 2050 accounting for heterogeneous income and 
proportional labor income taxation, as in Section 6.1 . The cohorts of the 60-64-year old workers constitute 7.09 and 6.84% 
of the stationary populations in 2010 and 2050, respectively. 
Table 13 reports our results for the threshold of allowing for early retirement. We consider three cases. First we assume 
no penalty for early retirement. Under this specification, about 75% of the workers retire during age 60–64, and the remain- 
31 See Online Appendix G.3 for further details. 
32 Data on the retirement age are available from http://www.oecd.org/els/emp/average-effective-age-of-retirement.htm . Information of the pension system 
in each country is taken from Pensions at a Glance documents available on http://www.oecd.org/social/oecd- pensions- at- a- glance- 19991363.htm . 
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ing 25% retires from the age of 65. We then re-calculate the solution accounting for the financial cost of early retirement, 
using the information provided by the OECD Pension at a Glance 2017: Country Profiles-United States . 33 According to this in- 
formation, individuals are allowed to retire from the age of 62, but their pension is reduced by about 6.7% annually for the 
first three years. After three years the reduction falls to 5%. This applies to individuals with a statutory retirement age of 
65. Therefore, as a second case, we re-computed the model solution under the assumption of an average penalty of 13.33% 
for those retiring two years earlier (two years penalty at 6.7%). In the final case, we re-computed the model solution under 
the assumption of a maximum penalty of 25% for those retiring four years earlier (three years penalty at 6.7% plus one year 
penalty at 5%), as this is the specification most consistent with the model protocol (early retirement at age j = 9 ). 
Two main observations may be made about the results reported the Table below regarding the implications of labor 
choice at the extensive margin for our analysis and pension systems legislations. First, early retirement may increase the 
pension cost and therefore reduce the threshold. The quantitative effect depends crucially on the financial cost associated 
with this choice, in particular the legislated reduction in pension payments during the years of early retirement. Second, 
the effects of labor choices at the extensive margin are likely to vary across countries, possibly resulting in an increase in 
the threshold in countries where individuals retire late and a reduction in countries where they retire before the legal age. 
An accurate estimate of these effects is beyond the scope of the present paper. Further exploration of these issues within 
an OLG model might include having a more detailed demographic specification that accounts for different incentives on 
labor market choices at the extensive margin other than those provided by the pension system, such as health, a distinction 
between men and women, and family background. 
6.4. Increasing college attainment 34 
Conesa et al. (2019) show that the labor income tax rate required to finance additional pension payments due to the 
demographic transition in the United States is greatly reduced if college education continues to rise. They find that, if the 
college attainment rate increases from 22.8% during 1980–2005 to a projected rate of 67.4% in 2100, the required increase 
in labor income taxes is reduced by 10.1 percentage points. 
We follow the analysis of Conesa et al. (2019), considering a simplified version of their model. 35 In particular, we distin- 
guish two types of households, low-skilled and high-skilled, that supply labor l 1 
t, j and l 
2 
t, j with individual productivities ǫ1 z j 
and ǫ2 z j at age j , respectively. The skill productivities ǫ i , i = 1 , 2 , are chosen to reflect permanent income differences be- 
tween the low- and high-skilled workers, as described in Online Appendix G.1. Accordingly, total labor income, w t ǫi z j A t l 
i 
t, j 
, 
is the product of the wage rate per efficiency unit, w t the permanent efficiency ǫ i of type i = 1 , 2 , the age-efficiency factor 
z j , the aggregate productivity level A t and working hours l 
i 
t, j 
at age j in period t . The shares of the two types of skills in 
each cohort j in period t are denoted by μ1 t and μ
2 
t (with μ
1 
t + μ
2 
t = 1 ) and are assumed to follow a linear increase over the 
period 2010–2100 as in Concesa et al. (2019). Other model assumptions are identical to those described in Online Appendix 
G.1. 
The new parameter that we need to calibrate in this sensitivity analysis is the share of the college graduates μ2 t in 
population. For the United States, we follow Conesa et al. (2019) and assume that μ2 t rises (linearly) from 22.8% during 
1980–2005 to a projected rate of 67.4% in 2100. We also extend the analysis to Germany, Italy, and Spain, using data from 
Roser and Ortiz-Ospina (2019) which are taken from the World Bank EdStats and Unesco Institute of Statistics. In particular, 
we use linear transition paths between the 2010 levels and the projected levels in 2050. These are, in percentage, 20.3 and 
32.0 for Germany, 10.2 and 19.9 for Italy and 9.8 and 19.2 for Spain. Beyond 2050, we extrapolate values linearly. 
Fig. 8 shows the estimated effect on the threshold dependency ratio of rising college attainment. The threshold in the 
case of two skills and rising college attainment (red line) increases relative the S1-NPC scenario (black line) in all four 
countries. The quantitative effect is most marked in the United States where the threshold rises well above the upper bound 
of the OADR2 by 2100. The increase is relatively modest for Italy and Spain, since the new threshold lies just above that 
under the S1-NPC scenario. The threshold for Germany is however higher than that under S1-NPC, being in line with the 
median OADR2. It is worth observing that these cross-country differences in the shift of the threshold once accounting for 
rising college attainments are consistent with the differences in the ranking of the projected shares of educated workers 
by 2100 across the four countries (0.64 for the United States, 0.45 for Germany, 0.31 for Italy and 0.30 for Spain). We 
conclude commenting on the effects of rising college attainments on the probability of reaching the threshold by 2050 in 
the four countries. The results under S1-NPC were reported in the upper part of Table 10 . The probability is unchanged 
for the United States, because it is zero under S1-NPC and the threshold further increases once accounting for the higher 
college attainment. The probability remains virtually unchanged for Italy and Spain, because their threshold are very close 
to those under S1-NPC. For Germany, given the larger increase in the threshold compared to Italy and Spain, the probability 
of reaching the threshold by 2050 declines from 99 to 45% in the case of rising college attainment. 
33 See http://www.oecd.org/social/oecd- pensions- at- a- glance- 19991363.htm . 
34 We would like to thank an anonymous referee who suggested this analysis to us. 
35 In addition to our model, these authors also consider skill-specific fertility rates and survival probabilities. Furthermore, health insurance in the form 
of Medicaid and Medicare as well as private health insurance is also modeled. 
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Fig. 8. OADR2, thresholds under S1-NPC, and thresholds under increasing college attainment for Germany, Italy, Spain and the United States, 2010–2100. 
7. Conclusion 
The paper develops an OLG life-cycle model that explicitly accounts for limits to the ability of governments to increase 
tax revenues through the distortionary taxation of income from capital and labor. This fiscal limit imposes a constraint 
on pension provision. As a result, under their current pension arrangements governments may find that there is an upper 
bound to the size of the dependency ratio that they can sustain solely from the revenues from the taxation of income. This 
threshold to the dependency ratio is obtained as a competitive equilibrium solution to the model. We measure the distance 
that an economy is from this threshold and the probability of reaching the threshold at some point in the future. Once this 
distance falls to zero, reform of the current pension arrangements becomes essential and can no longer be postponed. We 
consider three possible reforms to pension arrangements: partial financing using consumption taxes, a reduction in pension 
contributions and an increase in the retirement age. 
Many factors affect the ability of a country to sustain its pension system. These include the levels of government spend- 
ing on consumption, transfers and pensions; the distance of the economy from the peak of the Laffer hill; the demographic 
structure of the population and its projected change. Countries differ significantly across all of these dimensions. The pro- 
posed threshold dependency ratio is a summary measure that takes account of all of these factors simultaneously in a 
relatively simple and informative way. 
In all of the countries we study we find that the threshold is increasing over time but not as rapidly as demographic 
forecasts of the dependency ratio. As a result, the distance from the threshold is found to decline very quickly and the 
probability of reaching the threshold is increasing. 
There are significant differences in thresholds levels, distances and probabilities among these countries. The outlook for 
most of the European countries is of particular concern. Compared to the United States, all have, on average, smaller fiscal 
spaces, more generous pension systems, are older and are projected to age much faster. The European countries are therefore 
found to be much closer to the threshold than the United States in 2010 and are predicted to reach the threshold well before 
2050. In contrast, the United States is found to maintain a positive distance until 2100. 
The probability of the United States reaching the threshold can be reduced to be close to zero either by increasing con- 
sumption taxation by 5 percentage points, or by reducing the replacement ratio of the pension by 10 percentage points, or 
by increasing the retirement age to 70. In contrast, such policy changes bring only marginal improvements to the pension 
outlooks for the EU14 countries and only serve to highlight how pressing an issue pension reform is for these EU14 coun- 
tries. For the European countries we further consider the impact of planned changes in their pension systems. These reduce 
the cost of public pensions in most countries, resulting in thresholds being closer to the median values of the projected 
OADRs rather than their lower bounds. 
A further difference is that whereas for the Unites States there is a clear welfare advantage to employing higher con- 
sumption taxes to achieve a given distance from the threshold than having a lower replacement ratio or a higher retirement 
age, there is no such preference ordering for the European countries. Their welfare ranking differ depending on country- 
specific characteristics, such as the design of the tax system, the current level of public spending, private sector preferences 
and productivity. 
We have also examined to what extent these conclusions might be affected by different modelling asumptions. We con- 
sidered four extensions: income heterogeneity among individuals; non-linear labor income taxation; labor supply choice at 
the extensive margin for retirement; rising college attainments. We find that income heterogeneity affects countries differ- 
ently, that progressive taxation reduces the threshold, that this reduction is greater the small is the elasticity of labor supply, 
that early retirement is also likely to reduce the threshold but the choice to retire early is affected by the cost involved. In 
contrast, increasing college attainments have the effect of increasing the threshold. 
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Although the quantitative results presented in this paper are based on a very stylized model of the economy, we believe 
that they have identified fundamental problems for the provision of public pensions in advanced economies that require 
urgent attention. A more complete analysis, beyond the scope of this paper, might also take account of several further 
implications that population aging may have for the macro-economy and for public finances. For example: (i) the political 
feasibility of extracting the maximum revenue from the taxation of income; (ii) the cost of non-pension-related components 
of public spending; and (iii) long-term rates of economic growth. We do not, however, anticipate that taking account of 
these considerations would alter our main finding, namely, that a large number of European countries are likely to reach 
their threshold dependency ratio within the next 20–30 years. 
In our model demographic parameters evolve deterministically and the policy action is known in advance with certainty. 
Both assumptions are taken to simplify the analysis. They are also necessary due to the restrictions on the computational 
time and in light of the high number of equilibria under consideration. However, both kinds of uncertainties are likely to 
prevail empirically. Uncertainty with respect to the demographics has been studied by J-V (2001) who considers stochastic 
fertility rates in an OLG model of the United States. He finds that aggregate equilibrium effects of the aging baby boomers 
depend critically on whether fertility rates are mean-reverting or remain at their current low levels. Uncertainty with re- 
spect to the timing of policy has been analysed for the first time by Kitao (2018) . He considers the effect of a pension 
reduction in Japan which takes place with a probability of one third in either 2020, 2030 or 2040. Kitao finds that a de- 
lay of policy implementation exacerbates the fiscal burden and welfare costs, in particular among the older individuals. It 
would be interesting to elaborate on the effects of these two kinds of uncertainty in our present analysis. It would also be 
interesting to consider the effects of uncertainty about the particular pension policy reform that is chosen by the goverment 
in the future. 36 Often it is unknown whether the government may implement either a pension reduction or an increase 
in the retirement rate or a mixture of the two. The solution methods developped by Ríos-Rull (2001) and, in particular, 
Kitao (2018) provide the necessary tools for such an analysis. 
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